Project on National Security Reform

INTRODUCTION:
On June 24, 1948, the Soviet leadership ordered a blockade of all ground entryways into the three Western-controlled sectors of Berlin. This attempt to force the Western powers out of Berlin resulted in a high-stakes power struggle between Washington and Moscow. The Truman administration faced the option of pulling out of Berlin or risking war in order to stay. In a decision that would influence the next forty years of Cold War politics, the administration opted to remain in Berlin and used an airlift to break the blockade, disproving many initial interagency assessments that the city could not be held. The breaking of the Berlin Blockade is often referred to as the first major American victory of the Cold War.

STRATEGY:
Despite early warnings, no comprehensive strategy existed to counter Soviet pressure worldwide or specifically in Berlin prior to or following the imposition of the blockade. Once the blockade began, the Truman administration oversaw a series of ad-hoc meetings to deal with the crisis largely sidelining the NSC and JCS. The President made hard choices behind closed doors and dominated decision-making. In addition, the Military Governor of Germany, General Clay, often exceeded his authority preceding and immediately following the start of the crisis. In fact, Clay was largely responsible for initiating the airlift, although he originally intended it as a temporary measure. This ad-hoc strategy proved so effective, however, that it slowly won over skeptics in Washington, and was converted into a long-term policy. However, Truman and the NSC failed to define a threshold of sacrifice the United States was willing to make to stay in Berlin, despite repeated requests by the JCS for such a decision.

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
The U.S. government initially did not collaborate to develop a strategy in the face of the brewing crisis in Berlin. As a result, the administration lacked a coherent plan on how to respond to the blockade. This, in turn, forced General Clay to act unilaterally. In the following weeks, Truman successfully scheduled comprehensive ad-hoc meetings, which included members of the major agencies involved (President, Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as the Secretaries of Defense and State). These organizations cooperated to create a response plan, despite persisting conflict between individuals and agencies. The JCS in particular, and NSC at times, resisted sending additional aircraft to assist in the airlift, believing this could endanger U.S. strategic positions elsewhere in the world. When provided with clear guidelines from Washington, however, the military almost flawlessly implemented the airlift strategy. This efficiency allowed for secret diplomacy (unknown even to Clay in Berlin) to help end the crisis.

EVALUATION:
The decisiveness of regional decision makers, particularly military governor Clay, and the eventual operational coordination produced an airlift operation of unprecedented dimensions. However, poor preparation for the crisis and Washington’s initial indecisiveness after the beginning of the blockade, which was caused primarily by incomplete implementation of the National Security Act, hampered the effort. President Truman, afraid that the NSC’s increased importance could weaken his position in the foreign policy process, tried to limit the body’s involvement. Further, the Act did not provide for an institutional link between the NSC and the JCS, which weakened both institutions. As a result of insufficient intra-institutional communication and an improper balance among the available containment strategies and military resources, the administration was unable to prepare effectively for a showdown with the Soviet Union.

RESULTS:
Overall, the Berlin airlift proved a successful strategy in response to the Soviet blockade. The operation became a symbol of American commitment to Europe, significantly improving the U.S. diplomatic and strategic positions on the continent at relatively low cost. The failures in U.S. strategy were overcome by the efficiency of the airlift. The U.S. government learned from the weaknesses of the response and amended the National Security Act in 1949 to enhance the effectiveness of the NSC and JCS. The crisis also likely contributed to the promulgation of NSC 68, a comprehensive strategy approved in 1950 to manage the Cold War with the Soviet Union.

CONCLUSION:
Scholarly analysis of the Berlin blockade celebrates the first major U.S. victory of the Cold War, but it also exposes major weaknesses in implementing the interagency processes embodied in the National Security Act. Authors who focus on the initial response and the organization of the security agencies point out significant flaws in the U.S. reaction to the blockade. Experts also agree, however, that the outcome of the airlift was very close to an ideal solution. The strong leadership of Truman in Washington and Clay in Berlin helped overcome the lack of a grand strategy toward the Soviet Union. Washington achieved its goals at a relatively low cost, losing only 33 men over the course of the airlift while saving the city from Soviet coercion.

INTRODUCTION:
With roots that predate the Soviet-Afghan War, Afghanistan’s opium trade has exploded into a multi-billion-dollar industry that encircles the globe. In 2007, Afghanistan produced about 90 percent of the world’s opium supply and the country has driven the doubling of global production since 2005. The drug trade has fueled corruption, allegedly reaching into President Hamid Karzai’s family, and has become the primary funding mechanism for the Taliban insurgency. After a slow start, the United States is putting increased effort into counternarcotics. However, a flawed strategy, weak staffing, and a series of interagency problems have hindered progress. The failure to combat the opium trade has directly contributed to the continuing instability and insurgency within Afghanistan.

STRATEGY:
At the highest levels, the Office of National Drug Control Policy sets counternarcotics policy, and the National Security Council coordinates Afghanistan issues. Early on, the Bush administration opposed enlarging the U.S. military’s security mission to include drug interdiction and eradication. The administration feared this approach might interfere with the pursuit of high-value targets in Operation Enduring Freedom and the White House was also averse to bogging down the military with what it viewed as a nation-building task. As criticisms of counternarcotics policies mounted, the White House unveiled a new counterdrug strategy at the end of 2004. The policy complemented Afghan and British counternarcotics programs and included five main pegs: eradication, interdiction, alternative livelihoods, police/judicial reforms, and public awareness. The plan called for simultaneous, sequential, and balanced actions to root out corruption and improve security while establishing the rule of law.

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
The State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law-Enforcement Affairs coordinates the U.S. government’s Afghanistan counternarcotics efforts. The State Department also directs eradication, the largest and most visible program in the Afghan drug war, and the communications campaign. The U.S. Agency for International Development is the lead agency on alternative-livelihood programs, which experts believe are critical to filling the economic void left by eradication. The Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) manages interdiction and DOJ is also the lead agency for law-enforcement and judicial reforms in Afghanistan. DEA units have received intelligence and logistical support from the Defense Department since 2005, although the military has not deliberately targeted drug labs or warehouses unless soldiers ran across them on routine operations.

EVALUATION:
The overall response to Afghanistan’s opium problem was weak from the start, in part because U.S. and world leaders initially failed to recognize the truly destabilizing effect of Afghanistan’s drug trade. Early U.S. analysis of the problem was muddled; officials blamed opium for Afghanistan’s security problems while paradoxically claiming that insecurity was the main obstacle to an effective counternarcotics strategy. The failure to recognize the criticality of state-building to counternarcotics operations has resulted in counterproductive actions, poor planning and coordination, and tensions between counternarcotics and counterterrorism. In addition, much of the U.S. funding for counternarcotics is not included in agencies’ annual budgets. Rather, it is provided through supplemental, or “emergency” spending bills, which make it difficult for Congress to perform its important oversight function. The counternarcotics mission has also been hindered by a uniform shortage of personnel across involved agencies and departments. A simultaneous reliance on contractors has led to management and communication problems, as many contractors were barred from supervising other contractors or government employees. The contracts themselves were drafted quickly, with minimal input from the U.S. embassy in Kabul.

RESULTS:
The United States has spent about $1.6 billion on counternarcotics to date but with little effect. The Taliban and al Qaeda continue to benefit from the drug trade directly through trafficking and cultivation and indirectly by providing protection, taxing production, or engaging in money laundering. Experts estimate the drug trade provides up to half the Taliban’s funding and somewhat less for al Qaeda. In addition, the heavy focus on eradication has alienated small farmers and left other elements of the U.S. strategy neglected. The opium trade has resulted in corruption and security problems that have proved toxic to the Afghan government. Afghanistan was the eighth most-unstable nation in the world in 2007, according to the “Failed State Index” compiled annually by the U.N. Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy magazine.

CONCLUSION:
There is clear evidence that the drug trade finances the Taliban and a strong correlation exists between cultivation and attacks on coalition forces. If Afghanistan’s opium trade were destroyed, it would deal a serious blow to the insurgency and free the government from a corrupting influence. This victory, experts agree, cannot be achieved without a prolonged plan for economic development. It also cannot be accomplished without a rapid build-up in the Afghan government’s capacity to enforce security and the rule of law. Thus, the approach will require that the United States use “soft” and “hard” power in a comprehensive, cohesive manner.

INTRODUCTION:
In the wake of the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, the question “why they hate us” became a topic of interest to U.S. policymakers. Opinion leaders and government officials began referring to a “war of ideas” and the struggle over who would influence “hearts and minds.” At the root of this emphasis was increasing recognition that in the years to come, the opinions and decisions of foreign individuals, in addition to those of other nation-states, could greatly impact the security of American citizens. However, as U.S. officials began mounting a campaign to influence public opinion in the Islamic world, it soon became clear that the strategy being employed was deeply flawed. The position of under secretary for public diplomacy and public affairs—the top public diplomacy posting in the government—has turned over five times from October 2001 to the present and as the Bush administration’s five public diplomacy czars came and went, the White House, the State Department and other executive branch agencies approached public diplomacy in an ad hoc manner. It was June 2007 before the White House released a formal national strategy for public diplomacy. Further, the marginal positive effects of official public diplomacy efforts have proven easily undermined by off-the-cuff statements and unplanned events, from the abuses of Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay, to Lt. Gen. William G. Boykin’s couching the war on terrorism in explicitly religious terms, to the President’s own misstep in calling the war on terrorism a “crusade.”

STRATEGY:
The Bush administration completed its strategy for public diplomacy in June 2007, five and a half years after the 9/11 attacks. Before that time, efforts were largely ad hoc and unsupported by doctrinal guidance and it remains unclear the impact this new strategy will have. The U.S. approach to challenges in the Middle East since 9/11 failed to consider public diplomacy while creating policy, reinforcing the reactive nature of public diplomacy efforts and resulting in ill considered policy choices. In addition, the revolving-door ethos at the position of under secretary for public diplomacy and public affairs prevented a comprehensive strategy from emerging within the State Department.

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
One finding that is common across nearly all assessments of U.S. public diplomacy efforts in the Middle East was that future progress in efforts to revamp public diplomacy would hinge on strong support from the White House. Without this, there has been a general failure to integrate public diplomacy with a wide range of U.S. government activities throughout the Middle East. This has also resulted in the failure of the U.S. government to project a uniform message when conducting these activities and kept public diplomacy out of sync with policy.

EVALUATION:
In particular, the inaccurate determination of factors affecting the perception of foreign publics, the lack of a clear strategy and metrics for determining outcomes, a failure to unify the public diplomacy effort, a lack of interface between public diplomacy concerns and U.S. foreign policy, high turnover and resource shortfalls in the State Department and lack of emphasis by the White House help to explain the weakness of the U.S. government response.

RESULTS:
U.S. public diplomacy efforts in the Middle East after 9/11 have been unable to prevent a hugely negative trend in public perceptions of the United States. U.S. policy has remained extremely unpopular in the region, and a dangerous pattern has emerged in which antipathy for certain policies veered into an overarching, “essentialist” negative view of America.

CONCLUSION:
It is true that U.S. public diplomacy efforts heretofore have been hobbled by an inaccurate diagnosis of the problem, murky strategic conception, poor implementation, a lack of unity of effort and a failure to create a means of interface between policymaking and public diplomacy. But fixing these process flaws will not ameliorate the underlying reality: By and large, Muslims dislike what we do, not who we are. U.S. foreign policy should not be crafted with public opinion of the Islamic world as the foremost consideration. An outright critique of post-9/11 foreign policy is well beyond the scope of this case study, but what is not beyond its scope is the acknowledgement that the linkage between U.S. policies and public diplomacy efforts is not a burden to be dodged or a spurious connection.

INTRODUCTION:
During the 1990s, the United States was involved in multiple post-war stability operations in locations ranging from Bosnia to Somalia to Haiti. Despite this increase in the prevalence of nation building missions, it was during this period that many policy makers considered such activities overly expensive, outside U.S. interests, and likely futile. Rather than addressing the underlying conditions that lead to state fragility, or designing a strategy to meet the emerging trend of low-intensity conflicts, the United States instead approached each crisis on a case-by-case, ad hoc basis. In most instances the military headed these efforts with minimal involvement from civilian departments and agencies. However, by the end of the decade, the defense and foreign policy communities began to perceive that civilians were better suited to carry out nation building tasks. Designs for a U.S. government (USG) structure to support this civilian-centric approach followed shortly thereafter.

STRATEGY:
In 1997, the Clinton administration issued Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56, which called upon all U.S. government departments and agencies to improve the planning and management of complex contingency operations (i.e. nation building). While PDD 56 made strides in resolving the “unity of effort” issue, it fell short in many areas. By the time the Bush administration assumed office in 2001, it had been effectively discarded. However, as post-war Iraq fell into chaos, Senate Report 108-247 reiterated the need to avoid post-war operations that, “…cobbled together plans, people and resources in an ad hoc fashion, usually with the Defense Department in the lead.” To address growing calls for improved post-war reconstruction and stabilization (R&S) capabilities, President George W. Bush in late 2005 signed National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44. This directive provided the statutory authority for the Office for the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) and gave the Secretary of State the responsibility to “coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities.” The directive also established a Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) on Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations within the National Security Council (NSC).

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
Some Department of State (DOS) staff have indicated that senior officials did not communicate strong initial support for S/CRS. There was also resistance from several DOS regional bureaus about applying the NSPD44 framework devised by the NSC. In support of NSPD 44, the Department of Defense (DOD) in 2005 issued Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations. The directive elevated “…postwar stability and reconstruction operations as a ‘core U.S. mission.’” This statement called for stability operations to be “addressed and integrated across all DOD activities, including doctrine, training, education, exercises, and planning.” Also, in March 2007, the NSC approved the The Interagency Management System (IMS) for Reconstruction and Stabilization to integrate strategic level planning and implementation within the USG. Recent U.S. government efforts to create more interagency rotation and joint education opportunities have been a positive step towards institutionalizing post-war capabilities as well. However, the slowness in setting up a Civilian Reserve Corp (CRC)––a cadre of citizen diplomats with technical skills that would deploy quickly to hostile environments to support reconstruction––illustrates that progress has remained incomplete.

EVALUATION:
The NSC framework clearly intends much of the policy planning and coordinating of R&S to be driven through S/CRS initiative and authority. While the organizational chart seems fairly clear regarding who will take the lead on interagency coordination, it remains to be seen how much input S/CRS receives from the regional bureaus at State. It is clear that some bureaus at DOS believe S/CRS is assuming their traditional roles and responsibilities. For example, the U.S. Agency for International Development had traditionally taken the operational lead when it came to reconstruction operations and confusion existed within the agency when S/CRS took over these responsibilities. It is also uncertain whether policy and operational planning between DOD and S/CRS will be completely integrated. A Pentagon memo suggests that there are elements of Directive 3000.05 which remain unclear, especially in promoting cohesiveness between the S/CRS’s Active Response Corps and the military. In addition, some experts believe that S/CRS is at too low a bureaucratic level to be effective and/or that the S/CRS coordinator lacks the authority needed to create a true interagency post-conflict capability. Another possible weakness in S/CRS is the persistent and traditional culture at State that has resisted taking a more expeditionary posture.

RESULTS:
The most positive aspect of NSPD 44 is the shift in resources to pre-planning and coordination at an unprecedented level. S/CRS and the Response and Reserve Corps have yet to be truly tested. However, the costs of not having an interagency post-war capability are clear. A critical lesson from the low-intensity conflicts during the 1990s and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is that R&S responses to crises have mostly been ad hoc. The mission usually goes to the agency or department that is most able to respond at the time––namely the Pentagon. This approach has brought heavy costs. In Iraq, for example, lack of phase IV (post-war) planning allowed the growth of an insurgency and interminable violence.

CONCLUSION:
Most indicators suggest the risk of state failure has increased in the period following the end of the Cold War. Effective U.S. mitigation of state failure will require improvement in interagency mechanisms and cooperation across the government. This means replacing the current ad hoc system with a permanent mechanism for effective joint civil-military operations. A whole-of-government response to future crises will be contingent upon identifying gaps and building capacities to meet a range of post-conflict scenarios. S/CRS does appear to have shifted the USG focus. It remains to be seen if the office will develop the clout it needs to effectively coordinate R&S activities.

INTRODUCTION:
More than 39 million people are now estimated to be living with HIV/AIDS worldwide. Sub-Saharan African has been most severely affected, with 68 percent of the world’s HIV-positive population now living in the region. The national security implications of HIV/AIDS have been recognized for nearly a decade. In July 2000, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1308, which declared that action was necessary before the AIDS pandemic could further threaten world stability. Shortly thereafter, President Bill Clinton announced that AIDS would be treated as a threat to U.S. national security. The 2000 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) determined that infectious diseases, including HIV/AIDS, “exacerbate social and political instability in key countries and regions in which the U.S. has significant interests.” The first large-scale U.S. government response to the HIV/AIDs threat was the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), created by President George W. Bush in 2003. Through this program, the United States directed $15 billion over five years to combat HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. To date, PEPFAR has financed testing for over 33 million people and supported the care of more than 6.6 million people infected or affected by HIV/AIDS, including 2.7 million orphans and vulnerable children.

STRATEGY:
The strategic and operational approach of PEPFAR is systematically prepared by the Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator (OGAC), in collaboration with the U.S. Departments of State, Defense, Commerce, Labor, Health and Human Services (in particular the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; the Food and Drug Administration; and the National Institutes of Health), the Agency for International Development, and the Peace Corps. With a comprehensive five-year strategy, PEPFAR has evolved as new partners have been incorporated into the fight against AIDS and as innovations, input, experience, and outcomes have been measured and evaluated. Through PEPFAR, the U.S. government is working with international, national, and local leaders worldwide to support integrated prevention, treatment, and care programs. These three categories are the focus of PEPFAR’s efforts. As a work in progress, PEPFAR’s over-arching strategy tries to remain flexible and responsive to the varied nature of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. However, the policy process in Washington, including the budget process, is such that this sought-after pliancy is limited.

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
The PEPFAR strategy was to identify the existing capacity of the implementing agencies and harness and expand their comparative strengths into one synergistic U.S. government response coordinated by OGAC. The OGAC has worked to develop a number of mechanisms for communicating not only across agencies, but also between Country Teams and central staff. However, many opportunities for improving the comprehensiveness and effectiveness of services through better integration and coordination remain. In particular, current efforts to make budgeting, planning, and reporting mechanisms responsive to the congressional budget process actively work against integration.

EVALUATION:
PEPFAR’s strength is rooted in its lead-agency approach, clear interagency decision mechanisms, bipartisan political support, and immense resources. By centralizing the direction, creation, coordination, and implementation efforts of U.S. HIV/AIDS policy in the OGAC, the many U.S. government policies and programs which combat HIV/AIDS have been focused and synthesized. The lead-agency approach also allows OGAC to be the point for criticism, adjustments, and recommendations to U.S. HIV/AIDS policy. This focus allows for increased government efficiency and unifies the policy making process. However, the program does have some weaknesses caused by its wide scope, complex task, budgetary restrictions, and a few politically-charged policies.

RESULTS:
As a result of PEPFAR’s efforts, billions of dollars have been directed towards the care, prevention, and treatment of HIV/AIDS; millions of HIV/AIDS patients have been treated; global resources have been mobilized; international AIDS-combating efforts have been synthesized; HIV/AIDS stigma has been lessened; gender inequalities have improved slightly in the most-affected areas; democratic and political gains in the 15 focus countries have seen some success; and America’s diplomatic reputation—especially in Africa—has increased significantly.

CONCLUSION:
The expansion of the traditional definitions of security to include health threats requires increased interagency cooperation, as the skills of the Departments of State and Defense alone cannot succeed in confronting health challenges. Overall, under the OGAC, PEPFAR’s participating agencies have worked well together. While difficulties remain, the strategy and policies of the program remain uniform and each agency’s role is fairly well-defined.

INTRODUCTION:
President Richard M. Nixon’s visit to the People’s Republic of China (P.R.C.) in February 1972 was a precedent-setting milestone in American foreign policy. Since the victory of the Chinese Communist Party over Kuomintang forces in 1949, CCP Chairman Mao Zedong had led the P.R.C. down an increasingly isolated path in the international system. The P.R.C.’s initial foreign policy was to “lean to one side,” supporting the international Communist movement (and thereby the Soviet Union). U.S.-P.R.C. negotiations to “open” China took place behind closed doors, veiled in such secrecy that even relevant government organizations, particularly the State Department, were kept uninformed. This was enabled by the structure of President Nixon’s NSC, which centralized control of foreign policy in the hands of the President and his National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger.

STRATEGY:
In order to orchestrate diplomatic rapprochement with China, as well as facilitate other policy initiatives, the President and National Security Adviser developed a NSC structure which resulted in a streamlined, parallel flow of information from various NSC member organizations while concentrating decision-making power within the White House. This created an environment in which multiple policy alternatives were presented, and decisions were reached based on criteria that advanced an overall strategy, rather than being rooted in intra- and intergovernmental conflict and compromise.

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
The structure of the NSC under Nixon was such that the White House set the agenda, and agencies/departments were sometimes given identical tasks, which they completed in isolation. While the administration’s approach to China potentially resulted in duplicated labor, it also provided multiple independent policy perspectives which informed the policy-making process. This NSC structure sacrificed collective decision-making for the sake of decisively implementing long-term strategies.

EVALUATION:
The early implementation of Nixon’s NSC structure resulted in what David Rothkopf refers to as a “devastating bureaucratic first strike,” which defined a clear hierarchy of authority for NSC principals before they had any input on the matter. Nixon and Kissinger had viewed this as necessary in light of expected interagency conflicts, particularly between the Departments of Defense and State. They likewise felt that the State Department was forced to be more reactive than proactive in foreign policy formulation, due to its vast portfolio of responsibilities. This precluded State from engaging in much strategic planning; thus, the National Security Adviser took the lead in mid- to long-range planning. The most important factor in ensuring the effectiveness of the Nixon/Kissinger strategy to open China was the use of “back channel” communications, which eliminated the NSC principals from the decision-making process while still availing of their resources to draft policy briefs and recommendations for top officials. This is likewise the most controversial variable, as it reveals an institutionalized concentration of power in the hands of individual decision-makers. It also created an environment of mutual distrust between the White House and some NSC principals.

RESULTS:
The U.S. government successfully laid the foundations for Sino-American rapprochement. In doing so, it stabilized Northeast Asia, hedged against the Soviet threat, and provided a window for Mao’s successor, Deng Xiaoping, to begin the “reform and opening” of China. However, the Nixon administration also established a precedent for executive secrecy in the conduct of foreign relations, particularly regarding China.

CONCLUSION:
The case of the Sino-American rapprochement illustrates the trade-offs between collective consultation and decision-making in foreign policy, and the need for foreign policy-makers to be proactive and fleet of foot in order to effectively pursue bold initiatives in international affairs. The authors considered in this study are generally in agreement that the national security structures and processes used by Nixon and Kissinger were effective in facilitating successful Sino-American rapprochement. However, there is also a shared skepticism regarding whether or not the approach provides a healthy NSC model for other presidents to follow.

INTRODUCTION:
Soon after the GWOT began, President George W. Bush launched Washington’s freedom agenda: a strategy of global democracy promotion to augment America’s GWOT hard power efforts. In this context, the administration hoped that military might would decapitate al Qaeda leadership and disrupt terrorist networks, while democracy promotion would dissuade terrorist sympathizers and win local hearts and minds, thus preventing the emergence of terrorist safe havens or conditions conducive to the radicalization of local populations. The two mutually reinforcing policies, it has been argued, would complement each another to ensure success throughout the various stages of America’s new war. However, the record of U.S. engagement with Pakistan illustrates that both strategies have not been pursued with equal vigor nor have they garnered equivalent support. Of the two—GWOT and democracy promotion—the Bush administration has heavily favored and prioritized the former in Pakistan.

STRATEGY:
The U.S. government’s Pakistan strategy since 9/11 has been reactionary. Instead of developing comprehensive, integrated strategy, the Bush administration has excessively relied on President Pervez Musharraf and the Pakistani military to implement American aid and achieve U.S. goals—largely focused on counterterrorism. The general insufficiency of plans and/or procedures to coordinate the multiple objectives of America’s GWOT and democracy promotion agendas has impeded Washington’s efforts to leverage all elements of national power.

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
Despite the Bush administration’s efforts to improve integration, especially using newly established coordinating mechanisms such as the National Counterterrorism Center and the Advisory Commission on Democracy Promotion, the United States’ counterterrorism and democracy promotion strategies in Pakistan have been poorly coordinated among U.S. departments and agencies. The United States has done an even poorer job of balancing the priorities of these strategies and fusing their multiple objectives and pathways. Significant disagreements regarding the direction of America’s Pakistan policy have existed not only within the administration, but also within the Department of Defense (DOD), as well as between DOD components and the State Department and Central Intelligence Agency. Scholars have also noted the lack of communication and coordination “between different parts of the U.S. government, such as the executive branch and the Congress or the civilians and military…”

EVALUATION:
The absence of a counterterrorism body authorized to direct all relevant elements of national power and the lack of a comprehensive plan to achieve U.S. national security goals in Pakistan hindered America’s GWOT efforts. The nonexistence of aid architecture, the delay in establishing a mechanism charged with coordinating U.S. democracy promotion activities, the insufficiency of plans, the limited Pakistan experts in the proper offices, and the lack of a common definition of democracy or understanding of what constitutes a democracy program contributed to the U.S. government’s lackluster democracy promotion activities within Pakistan. A failure to balance the priorities and relative funding levels of U.S. programs in Pakistan resulted from the prioritization of GWOT over America’s democracy promotion agenda. Washington’s preoccupation with GWOT activities and the primary government institutions it has relied upon to implement its strategy in Pakistan has inadvertently helped to ensure that the majority of U.S. assistance would be military in nature; channeled through the Department of Defense to the Pakistani military.

RESULTS:
The cost of insufficient strategy development and coordination has been an entrenched, emboldened, and strengthened terrorist adversary; an escalation in the level of violence within Pakistan (that as of mid-2008 shows no sign of abating); the diminished power (and eventual ousting) of President Musharraf—the cornerstone of U.S. policy; and a Pakistani public ever more suspicious of U.S. intentions.

CONCLUSION:
Pakistan will likely remain central to U.S. efforts to eliminate the threat posed by al Qaeda and its affiliates in the short-term and counter the jihadist ideology used to recruit and indoctrinate terrorist sympathizers in the long-term. In addition, democracy promotion—or at least a derivative of the U.S. government’s current democracy agenda—will likely remain an essential foreign policy objective, as well as an underlying theme of American national security decision-making. However, from 2001 to the present, the U.S. government has been insufficiently organized to fuse the strategy demands of its GWOT and democracy promotion policies in Pakistan. Despite some successes in the counterterrorism realm, Washington has been unable to balance, through funding or implementation, the various objectives of its democracy promotion and GWOT strategies.

INTRODUCTION:
The attacks of September 11, 2001 illustrated the terrible costs of a decade of weak U.S. government (USG) strategies for combating terrorism and terrorist finance. However, the attacks also galvanized the USG into initiating sweeping reforms to establish a more cohesive structure of cooperation between intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Additionally, Washington enacted new laws and policies to broaden the authority of government agencies to attack terrorist organizations’ financial infrastructures and resources. The initial USG goal was, “starving the terrorists of funding and shutting down the institutions that support, or facilitate terrorism.” However, despite initial successes, the financial structures that underpin terrorism have not yet been “starved” of money, leading many U.S. policy makers to question whether the prevailing strategy of “freezing the money” is the correct one.

STRATEGY:
Prior to 9/11, in law and in strategic paradigms, the USG viewed the threat of terrorism as either a state-sponsored activity that did not constitute a direct threat to national security, or as a crime. To obstruct terrorist financing, legislation focused on freezing terrorist finances and prosecuting individuals for material support of terrorist acts. Various agencies charged with domestic and international law enforcement and intelligence collection prioritized preventing terrorist operations with sometimes peripheral emphasis on how terrorists raised money to carry out activities. In the aftermath of 9/11, the USG employed new laws, resources, and institutional mechanisms to counter the financing of terror. Immediately after 9/11, the “freeze the money” approach persisted as the mainstay of strategy with less attention given to following the money. Though effective against foreign government attempts to sponsor terrorism, this strategy has provided very little insight into sub-state actors’ and foreign terrorist organizations’ fundraising mechanisms. Recently, there has been a more balanced strategic approach between freezing and following the money.

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
There was a general lack of cooperation prior to 9/11 among the USG agencies that engaged in the fight against terrorist financing. Information collection was scattered, unorganized, and inconsistently carried out. Constant infighting between the Treasury Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the Department of Justice (DOJ) impeded efforts to achieve effective integration. The Treasury Department and CIA also exhibited reluctance to contribute personnel to the Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Center (FTATC). After 9/11, interagency cooperation improved substantially. Within concerned agencies, new units were established to ensure that terrorist financing is given proper emphasis and that long-term intelligence collection and analysis is taking place. In cases where operational overlap occurred before 9/11, largely effective remedies were implemented to ensure USG resources would not be wasted. Still, there has been conflict between agencies over the “freeze the money” versus the “follow the money” approach. Those agencies with specialities in finance often side with the “freeze the money” strategy as it provides not only quantifiable results, but is also high profile. Other agencies, like the FBI and CIA, focus more on following the money, using that information to track and kill terrorists.

EVALUATION:
The USG agencies that are capable of collecting financial intelligence lack a single, over-arching entity to direct and coordinate their actions. The extent to which the National Counterterrorism Center may effectively assume this role, is not yet known. The government’s emphasis on investigating terrorism finance has increased markedly. However, it remains unclear which agency is best suited to spearhead counterterrorist financing efforts. In addition, many agencies still gather and horde intelligence, distributing it on a “need-to-know” basis. Though cooperation has improved, deficient architectures still exist to stymie the flow of information and/or impede it from flowing efficiently. Lastly, although the strategy of the USG has evolved, it is still unclear whether freezing or following the money will be the focus of U.S. efforts.

RESULTS:
Information gathering pre-9/11 was scattered, unorganized, and inconsistent. Interagency cooperation was weak and riddled with infighting. This dynamic left groups such as al Qaeda with an operational edge against U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Post-9/11, over-reliance on freezing the money initially cost the USG valuable time in its efforts to understand and uncover terrorist financing methods. Excessive designations, freezes, and seizures without clear evidence resulted in many government actions being overturned in court, damaging what was hailed as a first strike against terrorism. Court reversals hurt USG credibility and its capacity to receive assistance from other nations. Significant legislation has been passed since 9/11 expanding the powers of government agencies so that they can better frustrate terrorists’ use of the global financial system. At the same time, with information regarding USG methods and successes widely available, post-9/11 actions are thought to have spurred the evolution of terrorists’ fundraising towards informal value transfer systems which are more difficult to undermine.

CONCLUSION:
In the fight against terrorist finance, there is improved synergy between U.S. government agencies. Efforts like Operation Green Quest, the Foreign Terrorist Asset Targeting Group, and the Financial Review Group have improved financial intelligence sharing. As a result of new financial intelligence units within USG agencies, a financial angle is targeted in almost every terrorist investigation. However, no overarching authority exists today to ensure efficient pursuit of counterterrorist financing strategy.

INTRODUCTION:
On October 4, 1957, the first artificial satellite was launched into orbit. The 58cm silver sphere, Sputnik, or “fellow traveler,” ushered in the space age and ignited a wave of panic in the United States. This singular event would precipitate a fundamental restructuring of U.S. science, aeronautics and space programs. The 1958 Space Act established a civilian agency, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), unifying the efforts of multiple government agencies. The legislation that created NASA also formed the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) to temper the severe interservice rivalry that had plagued the Armed Services’ research programs. Washington’s successful response to the Sputnik challenge would ultimately vault the United States past the Soviet Union in the resultant race for superior space technology and prestige.

STRATEGY:
Pre-Sputnik science and space strategy was dominated by redundant efforts in Intercontinental Ballistic Missile development and general interservice rivalry over program development. Initially, the civilian element of the space program was necessary only to establish the legal right of overflight, which would allow satellites to traverse the space above any country on earth. This gave little regard to the prestige or propaganda value of a potential “space race.” However, with the help of the President’s Science Advisory Committee (PSAC), Eisenhower was able to develop effective, reasoned, and rational strategies to ensure U.S. national security after the launch of Sputnik. This was achieved through the introduction and passage of the Space Act, which created NASA and ARPA, as well as an enhanced emphasis on science and mathematics in public education.

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
Severe interservice rivalries plagued the U.S. space and missile programs prior to the launch of Sputnik. This antagonistic dynamic continued in the midst of Eisenhower’s effort to allay the nation’s fears in the wake of Soviet space successes and to implement the Space Act. The intense debate regarding the militarization of space and the utility of a prestige-oriented space race also complicated Eisenhower’s response to the crisis.

EVALUATION:
The PSAC was crucial to the successful conceptualization and implementation of Eisenhower’s response to Sputnik, the Space Act. This was due to the President’s trust in Science Advisor James R. Killian, the impartial advice the committee provided, and the unrestricted access to government programs and information granted to PSAC. Eisenhower’s leadership also was a key factor, even if somewhat of a double-edged sword. While his calm and rational approach facilitated the development of the Space Act, it also proved slow in easing public fears exacerbated by the heavily politicized Senate Preparedness Subcommittee hearings investigating U.S. space efforts.

RESULTS:
Successes of the Space Act included the creation of a civilian space agency to encapsulate the fragments of the U.S. space program, as well as the eventual evolution of ARPA into the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. These organizations have furthered U.S. national security objectives and helped temper interservice rivalry in research and development projects and funding. The PSAC would also play a crucial role in future nuclear weapons strategy, particularly by beginning the first mutual nuclear test banning negotiations with the Soviet Union. In addition, subsequent presidents, such as Kennedy, would utilize the space program infrastructure to re-assert U.S. technological prowess by initiating the “moon race.”

CONCLUSION:
The case of the Sputnik crisis clearly depicts the contributions that rational, impartial scientific advice can make to U.S. national security. However, it also illustrates the challenges that must be faced in the wake of the public hysteria that often accompanies national crises. In analyzing the U.S. government’s post-Sputnik activities under Eisenhower, most authors note the vital and positive role played by the PSAC and Killian in the development and integration of the government’s formation of a highly capable and proficient space program. This represented an immense change from the earlier ineffectiveness of U.S. efforts to enter and exploit space.

INTRODUCTION:
From its inception in 1947, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has been shrouded in a considerable level of mystique. Particularly during the Cold War, the CIA appeared nearly invincible to some of its most capable rivals. However, following the 1961 operational debacle at the Bay of Pigs, the once-revered Agency became a “diplomatic liability” to the United States government. Domestically, the event ushered in an era of governmental scrutiny as newspapers abandoned traditional policies of self-censorship and began treating covert operations as matters of public interest. Abroad, the failed mission was exploited by the Soviet Union to intervene in Latin America, most prominently during the Cuban Missile crisis a year later. As a further consequence, relations between the President and the CIA became progressively estranged—a trend that would persist through the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. This case examines two very different methods for managing the national security process: that under President Eisenhower, who directed the invasion’s genesis, and that of Kennedy, who saw the plan to fruition.

STRATEGY:
The CIA’s original “Trinidad Plan” for the Cuban operation, developed under President Eisenhower, was reviewed and approved, albeit unenthusiastically, by a committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. President Kennedy’s initial hesitance to support the proposal was further reinforced by Secretary of State Dean Rusk who thought that the spectacular operation could not successfully conceal U.S. involvement. Pursuant to Kennedy’s guidelines, the CIA quickly reorganized the attack. The Agency selected the Bay of Pigs as the new landing site and formulated what became known as “Operation Zapata.” Zapata was considered by the CIA and JCS to be less optimal than the Trinidad Plan, though this judgment was unknown to the President at the time. Strategic changes continued even once the operation was underway. Thus, what began as a poorly planned attack progressed to an ad hoc invasion, partially handicapped by the White House and State Department’s fear of negative international public opinion.

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
Two days prior to the invasion, the United States launched a small airstrike against Castro’s air force. Due to interagency compromises, this attack was just large enough to implicate the United States and sufficiently small to be ineffective. The failed airstrike alerted the international community to U.S. involvement, leading President Kennedy, again influenced by Secretary Rusk, to postpone a second air attack. As a result, most of the Cuban air force remained operational, precluding all hope of a successful invasion. On D-Day, flotillas were delayed when many snagged on coral reefs, which the CIA had wrongly identified as seaweed or cloud reflections based on aerial photographs. By daybreak, Castro’s air force managed to contain the invading force of Cuban exiles until the arrival of 20,000 Cuban soldiers, armed with Soviet tanks, effectively ended the incursion.

EVALUATION:
The interagency, including the CIA, Department of State, JCS, and Executive Office of the President, failed to create an effective invasion plan. Proper integration was inhibited by CIA misinformation, miscommunication between planners and participants, excessive secrecy within the Agency and State Department, pervasive groupthink, and interagency compromises based on the lowest common denominator. Tactical complications during the landing, such as inadequate resources, mechanical failures, flawed CIA information regarding coral reefs, and poor distribution of ammunition and communications equipment, contributed to the weakness of the invasion. Operationally, successful execution was prevented due to abandonment of the Trinidad Plan, alterations to the airstrikes, and poor presidential advising. Strategically, Kennedy’s inexperience, poor CIA command organization, and erroneous CIA estimations of the strength of Castro and the Cuban Underground undermined the incursion. These failures, exacerbated by the urgent timeline and competing interagency interests, ultimately led to the Bay of Pigs debacle.

RESULTS:
Although it is difficult to undertake a comprehensive assessment of all the effects of the abortive operation, some primary consequences are evident. Abroad, the failed invasion proved an American diplomatic embarrassment, and undermined U.S. prestige. The CIA’s standing suffered and the Agency lost considerable influence as its golden age began to dissipate. The debacle seemingly legitimized Soviet interference in South America and inadvertently contributed to the Cuban Missile crisis. Finally, the event ushered in an era of adversarial relations between the U.S. media and the federal government, as journalists began treating covert operations as matters of public interest.

CONCLUSION:
When the United States government attempted to oust the pro-Communist Cuban government in 1961, its chief planners failed to establish an incontrovertible plan. Competing interests and flawed integration resulted in an ineffective, ad hoc strategy. Coherence proved inadequate due to the President’s inability to purge underlying assumptions about Cuba. Tactical, operational, and strategic errors contributed to the debacle, as did an urgent timetable and competing interagency interests. As a result, the CIA specifically, and the United States generally, suffered an irreparable loss of prestige.