Project on National Security Reform

INTRODUCTION:
The Iran-Contra affair resulted from two separate operations: the sale of arms to Iran in hopes that American hostages in Lebanon would be released and the supply of covert military aid to the Nicaraguan Contras waging an insurgency against the anti-American Nicaraguan government. While the diversion of profits from the arms deals to the Contras garnered the most attention at the time, the operations themselves represented a larger failure of the national security system. This study is important to the goals of the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) in that it does not seek to assign blame or focus on the diversion of money, but instead aims to examine how lapses in the national security policy process resulted in two operations of dubious legality and efficacy.

STRATEGY:
The Reagan administration did not use the existing formal national security structures to conduct its covert policies towards Nicaragua and Iran. Instead, the operations involving Iran and the Contras were executed in an ad hoc manner. The consultative process and transparency of the National Security Council (NSC) and the executive departments were abandoned in favor of ad hoc decision-making by a small group of individuals.
In part, the strategy was a direct result of the struggle between the executive and congressional branches of government over authority to determine foreign policy. In 1982, Congress passed the Boland Amendments, which prohibited the Department of Defense (DOD), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), or any other government agency from providing military aid to the Contras. The White House viewed this as an attempt to limit its constitutional right to determine foreign policy and sought to bypass the legislation. To this end, Reagan shifted operational control of Contra policies from the CIA and DOD to the NSC staff, since the latter were not subject to formal congressional oversight and technically did not fall under the amendments’ restrictions.

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
The President’s decision to bypass the NSC and the executive departments was due to a confluence of two factors—the executive-legislative struggle already mentioned and the internal conflicts within Reagan’s informal cabinet government. This led Reagan to grant his National Security Advisor (NSA) considerable powers to determine, implement, and execute foreign policy rather than simply facilitate decision-making.

Those agencies with the proper knowledge and skills to manage the operations in both Iran and Nicaragua—the CIA, the Department of State (DOS), and the DOD—were purposely bypassed because they were subject to congressional oversight. In addition, infighting prevented NSC principals from cooperating to form policy. DOS opposition to the arms deals and DOD’s refusal to run the Contra operation thus failed to influence actual events. The Secretaries of State and Defense remained outside the decision-making process and informational loop until the Iran-Contra affair was revealed in the press.

EVALUATION:
The conflict between the White House and Congress over control of foreign policy was the root cause of the Iran-Contra affair. This struggle resulted in the executive branch circumventing congressional controls to implement what it deemed were essential operations. Unfortunately, the means chosen—the operationalization of the NSC staff—proved ineffective. The NSA strictly controlled information about the administration’s policies regarding Iran and Nicaragua. While this approach allowed for greater secrecy and quicker decision-making, it did not facilitate improved decision-making or an appropriate level of debate about the policies to be implemented. As a result, policy implementation proved as problematic as policy formation. The NSC staff and NSA lacked the resources, capacity, or expertise to conduct Reagan’s foreign policies in Iran and Nicaragua independent of the other elements of the national security structure.

RESULTS:
The bypassing of the interagency decision-making structure led directly to the ill-advised operations in Iran and Nicaragua. By empowering only a few individuals with operational authority, a vital layer of discussion and open debate within the NSC was eliminated. This process allowed select actors to monopolize decision-making. They made errors in judgment and showed weakness in management.

The resulting policies worked at cross purposes. For example, trading arms for hostages undercut the State Department’s support for arms embargos against state sponsors of terrorism. The excessive role of the NSA and NSC staff also confused other U.S. government agencies as to who exercised authority over U.S. foreign policy. Such confusion allowed individuals to exploit the prestige of the White House to expand their authority far beyond their positions.

CONCLUSION:
The failure to properly debate the Iranian and Nicaraguan operations within the existing national security structure—which normally includes considerable congressional involvement—led to ad hoc and uncoordinated policies. This lack of integration directly contributed to the arms-for-hostages deal with Iran and allowed for continued covert assistance to the Contras despite congressional prohibitions and substantial opposition within the executive branch. Nevertheless, the Tower Commission, established to probe the Iran-Contra affair, ignored the larger implications of the scandal and did not recommend sufficiently comprehensive changes to the national security system.

INTRODUCTION:
Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States has sought to engage the newly independent Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan in three main areas: security, energy, and democracy promotion. Ultimately, an investigation of this effort is important to the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) because it demonstrates the difficulties involved in interagency policy planning towards developing and unstable regions. The study specifically highlights the importance of balancing policy priorities and properly assessing the needs, fears, and expectations of our foreign partners.

STRATEGY:
Towards the end of the George H. W. Bush Administration and during the early Clinton years, the United States did not have a clear plan for implementing its objectives in Central Asia. The region was not a top priority of U.S. policy planning and U.S. government agencies largely considered Central Asia a strategic backwater. By the mid- to late-1990s though, Washington had identified three enduring objectives—energy, security, and democracy promotion—and would pursue them in that order, with varying degrees of success, until 2001. After 9/11, Central Asia’s strategic importance rose considerably as both a staging ground for operations in Afghanistan and a front line in the greater Global War on Terror. Security had become a chief U.S. priority in 2001. By 2003, however, another shift in Bush Administration policy saw democracy and human rights assume preeminent positions in policy planning, to the detriment of Washington’s other goals.

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
During the Clinton Administration, U.S. policy was not well integrated. Responsibilities for the Central Asian region were divided between a number of agencies and departments. Various competing views of Central Asia existed and policy largely concentrated on neighboring countries, especially Russia, China, and Iran. This approach continued during the beginning months of the first George W. Bush administration, which focused its foreign policy on great power politics. After September 11, however, the United States became more deeply involved in the region. During the post-9/11 period, planning was largely split between the Departments of State and Defense. The U.S. Congress also complicated the decision making process by pressuring the executive branch to advocate for human rights and democratic reforms in Central Asia.

EVALUATION:
After successfully removing most Soviet-era weapons of mass destruction and related infrastructure from Central Asia, U.S. policy planners in the mid- to late-1990s saw few pressing security threats or great opportunities in the region. American planning thus focused on keeping Central Asia outside of great-power competition. This policy was successful, but created a regional security vacuum that Washington would have to manage when the U.S. presence increased considerably during the Bush Administration. Energy objectives were also partially successful as they achieved gains for US companies investing in Central Asia and agreement on the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline. Yet, plans stalled for a Trans-Caspian pipeline and the Caspian Pipeline Consortium’s pipeline has succeeded in further linking Central Asia to Russia. Democracy promotion initiatives remained a low priority during this period.

After 9/11, the United States signed base agreements with both Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan and established a strong military and political presence in the region. Soon after signing partnership agreements with Uzbekistan, Washington’s relationship with Tashkent began to unravel. Unfulfilled expectations, State Department and congressional insistence on upholding U.S. human rights objectives in the wake of the Karimov government’s May 2005 crackdown at Andijan, combined with mixed messages from the Departments of State and Defense all contributed to a rupture in U.S.-Uzbek relations and the subsequent eviction of U.S. troops from the Karshi-Kanahbad military base.

RESULTS:
U.S.-Central Asian engagement has produced mixed results. Successes in some areas have coexisted with failure or neglect in others. The Clinton Administration achieved most of its nonproliferation goals and many of its energy objectives. Yet, the administration failed to make much progress on political reform issues, and its policies helped promote a regional security vacuum. During the Bush administration, U.S. officials were initially highly successful in securing Central Asian government support for U.S.-backed security initiatives, including backing for the intervention in Afghanistan. Washington’s democracy promotion strategy proved less successful, engendering suspicion and resistance from regional governments.

CONCLUSION:
Under both the Clinton and Bush administrations, various U.S. Government departments and agencies did not fully articulate their goals or resolve inconsistencies among U.S. goals. As a result, U.S. strategies achieved only mixed results in a region that has become of elevated importance to the United States.

INTRODUCTION:
U.S. government security practices and structures proved ineffective in managing the bitter intra-state conflicts, complex emergencies, and ethnic cleansing associated with the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo. An examination of the Washington’s response to these is highly relevant to the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) because they heralded many characteristics of the post-Cold War security environment that continue to challenge U.S. interagency processes. Among others, these features include applying alliances beyond Cold War missions and conducting humanitarian interventions and other complex contingency operations.

STRATEGY:
The U.S. government failed to develop a coherent strategy in the first three years of the Bosnian war. Instead, an ad hoc, reactive stance allowed the belligerents to control the tempo of events. Although the Kosovo approach was developed increasingly within the interagency process, the strategy nonetheless failed to adequately integrate force and diplomacy.

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
Prior to Operation Deliberate Force and the Kosovo War, U.S. policies did not integrate diplomatic and military might. Force and diplomacy were eventually coordinated in Bosnia, but with difficulty and in a halting manner. In Kosovo, elements of national power were also inefficiently coordinated, turning what should have been a quick war into a drawn out and unproductive endeavor.

EVALUATION:
The U.S. response in Bosnia and Kosovo was weak primarily due to the lack of integrated analysis and planning between the diplomatic corps and the military. The State and Defense Departments proceeded from a shallow analysis, based on the assumption that the war resulted from atavistic ethnic hatred, and developed policy options centered on protecting departmental equities. Consequently, officials presented the president, Bill Clinton, with policies that could not be integrated.

Even when the National Security Council (NSC) dictated a strategy, the State and Defense Departments could not cooperate well due to their disparate perspectives on desired goals. Another shortcoming in the U.S. strategy was that no individual beneath the president could navigate the full political-military spectrum with authority and competency. In Bosnia and Kosovo, moreover, the military improperly interfered in political decisions and diplomats meddled in military matters. This led to tremendous tensions between State and Defense. In the Balkans, the absence of an official who could effectively manage, or at least understand, force and diplomacy proved detrimental to operations. In both Bosnia and Kosovo, effective management and implementation often resulted from ad hoc organizations and fait accompli decisions.

RESULTS:
The interagency struggle eroded Washington’s ability to take decisive action, reduced the credibility of American power, and made it difficult for Washington to lead the global response to the crisis. This impotence prolonged the Balkan crises very likely increasing its human and financial costs. In addition, collective security as a concept and NATO as an organization suffered serious blows. Even after U.S. officials decided to take action in Bosnia and Kosovo, the gap between diplomats and war fighters produced a policy that could not link political and military means and ends. Thus, Washington was able to end the wars but not establish a stable end-state, leaving problems (especially unresolved ethnic and international tensions) for U.S. national security policy that persist to this day.

CONCLUSION:
The U.S. government failed to develop a coherent strategy in the first three years of the Bosnian war, primarily due to a lack of integrated analysis and planning between diplomats and the military. As a result, the interagency process did not formulate policies for presidential consideration in an effective manner. The President received options that were both too few and too contradictory. This led to an ad hoc, ever-changing policy, most often characterized as “muddling through.”

Eventually, the NSC bypassed the interagency process to create a strategy. However, once the policy had been determined, the Departments of Defense and State struggled with implementation, which required the coordination of force and diplomacy. Many of these features also typified Washington’s handling of the Kosovo situation, demonstrating a poor learning curve despite the imperative of responding effectively to one of the most serious national security challenges confronting the United States during the 1990s.

INTRODUCTION:
For several decades, the U.S. government has sought to improve the counterterrorist capabilities of foreign governments. Two of the most prominent initiatives in this area include the Antiterrorism Training Assistance (ATA) program, first launched in 1983, and the counter-terrorism financing (CTF) assistance program, which began after the 1998 African embassy bombings and was expanded after 9/11. Because interagency cooperation has been especially critical to the successful and timely provision of foreign counterterrorist training, an examination of the management and organization of these initiatives is highly relevant to the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR).

STRATEGY:
Systematic procedures guide the management and implementation of the ATA and CTF programs. The Department of State (DOS) is the lead agency for coordinating, supporting, developing, and implementing all U.S. government policies and programs aimed at countering international terrorism. Within the DOS, the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) provides policy guidance and coordinates the activities of the relevant foreign capacity building initiatives. Through participation in the Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG) Training and Assistance Sub-Group (TASG), S/CT oversees the operation of the ATA program, which is implemented in the field by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS). To select participant countries, S/CT develops a three-tiered list of priority nations based on the potential terrorist threats to that state, the extent of U.S. interests at stake, the extent of the country’s current anti-terror capabilities, and the political will of its government to advance counterterrorism initiatives. Once a participant country has been identified, DS and ATA officials conduct an assessment of its anti-terrorism training needs. They then draft a comprehensive country plan, which outlines a specific program of training courses for the given country. The actual training is provided by ATA experts as well as personnel from other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, police associations, and private security firms.

CTF assistance is developed, coordinated, and implemented by the Terrorist Financing Working Group (TFWG) which reports to the CSG TASG. Established after the 9/11 attacks and co-led by the State Department’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) and S/CT, the TFWG is an interagency body whose participants include the Departments of Justice, Treasury, and Homeland Security, among others. To build comprehensive anti-money laundering and counterterrorist regimes, the TFWG: prioritizes countries’ needs based on intelligence and law enforcement judgments; dispatches interagency Financial Systems Assessment Teams to assess countries’ current CTF capabilities; drafts formal assessments and training plans; implements training; and promotes burden sharing with allies as well as international financial institutions.

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
Interagency tensions have, at times, frustrated coordination of U.S. counterterrorism programs. In ATA’s formative period, for example, agencies sometimes provided training without coordinating with the State Department. Similarly, interagency conflict initially complicated the development and delivery of CTF capacity programs due to rivalries between the Departments of State and Treasury. In addition, though both State and Treasury fund CTF capacity building, to date the departments have not typically coordinated budget requests.

Overall, participating agencies work well together in implementing counter-terror training. ATA cooperation improved after the creation of TASG in 1986. With regard to CTF assistance, officials note that cross-agency tensions eased as informal interagency relationships became better established.

EVALUATION:
Interagency mechanisms, manifested in the CSG, its TASG, and the TFWG, have effectively designed, deliberated, and deployed anti-terror capacity-building programs. Increasingly regular contact among officials has helped facilitate coordination to an extent that may have been difficult when agencies’ representatives met only on an ad hoc basis. Consistent attention at high levels, especially among S/CT leadership, is also critical for ensuring that program guidance does not drift and that other agencies do not offer training without coordination. ATA performance also depends on Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and congressionally approved budget appropriations. State Department leadership has not always been entirely successful in securing additional funding. The complexity of accurately measuring the effectiveness of ATA programs has exacerbated the difficulty of procuring budget requests. ATA and CTF resource limitations make adequate staffing a challenge, especially for CTF, as financial expertise is handsomely rewarded in the private sector. A lack of centralized funding for CTF capacity building has also engendered agency rivalries.

RESULTS:
The available evidence indicates that ATA and CTF endeavors have supported and defended U.S. security interests by improving the operational effectiveness of foreign counterterrorism officials. The ATA has achieved notable successes, training and assisting more than 60,000 foreign security and law enforcement officials from 161 countries. CTF capacity building has also directly contributed to counterterrorist operations and helped reduce terrorist financing. In addition, the programs have established beneficial working relationships between U.S. officials and their foreign counterparts.

CONCLUSION:
The achievements of capacity building initiatives demonstrate that a clear, institutionalized interagency coordinating structure can administer small interagency programs effectively. Within this structure, informal working relationships and individual leadership remain key components of programmatic success.

INTRODUCTION:
In this future scenario, Chinese aggression towards Taiwan provides the impetus for Sino-U.S. military confrontation. During the beginning stages of conflict, the technologically superior and network-centric United States military is quickly devastated. The damage was not inflicted by conventional weapons, but was instead caused by electronic connectors – small, seemingly harmless connective devices used to join electrical circuits together, which are absolutely critical to everything using power. By activating imbedded programming in these electronic connectors, the Chinese are able to neutralize the defense, attack, and navigation capabilities within every system on U.S. ships, submarines, and aircraft. Because Beijing controls two-thirds of the world’s supply of these connective devices, the Chinese are able to infiltrate, deliberately and strategically, the U.S. military and industrial base and target four of the military’s primary weapons systems.

The purpose of this scenario is not to convince the reader that information and technological warfare with China are inevitable, but to expose flaws and weaknesses within the national security apparatus. This hypothetical case calls attention to potential dangers of not addressing current weaknesses in our defense industrial base and global supply chain. It also highlights the importance of evaluating assumptions and questioning the meaning of events in order to better prepare for the future.

STRATEGY:
For the last 30 years, through mergers, joint ventures, outright acquisition and industrial espionage, the Chinese have gained access to and control of sensitive technologies. This is especially true in the electronics industry. In this scenario, China’s control of electronic connector production, combined with the ability of Chinese manufacturers to provide a multitude of components for at least four critical weapons systems (both of which are realities) allows for extensive infiltration of the U.S. industrial and military supply base. The infiltration was made even easier because virtually all ocean-borne shipping servicing the industrial base supply chain was Chinese-owned, providing multiple opportunities to control or deny movement of components and permitting the Chinese to disrupt the supply chain at will.

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
The military and economic elements of national power are ineffectively managed and integrated in this scenario. The major players in this type of situation include the Departments of State, Defense, Commerce, Treasury, Transportation, and the interagency Committee for Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) process. All these actors, as well as Congress, influence how and where our weapon systems should be manufactured and how their supply chains should be managed. Unfortunately, the monitoring of the supply chain proves insufficient and issues like “electronic connectors” go unnoticed because they are considered commodities. Because no one is responsible for the “big picture,” no one is in the position to identify dangerous patterns as they emerge. In fact, there are no U.S. government personnel dedicated exclusively to overarching strategy with a long term view. In addition, high-impact, low probability contingencies are of little interest to busy politicians who have no immediate incentive to express concern or initiate change.

EVALUATION:
The contracting supply chain consists of tiers. The higher the tier, the closer the supplier is to the finished product. Depending on the number of times a given component goes from one supplier to another, the number of tiers increases. The production process can consist of as many as ten tiers, but currently the United States only documents prime and subcontractors to the fourth tier. Beyond that, it is next to impossible to develop additional supplier identification data. The Department of Defense does not require component origins identification beyond the third tier, making maintaining cohesion and program security within the manufacturing and supply base extremely problematic. In addition, in 1991 the Defense Department’s Strategic Acquisition Initiative made it a requirement for U.S. defense contractors to look first to COTS (Commercial Off-The-Shelf) products when developing new technology and upgrades. The motivation for using COTS components is that they will reduce overall system development costs and save development time since they can be bought instead of being manufactured from scratch.

RESULTS:
Gradual reductions in standards and shortsightedness have created extensive security systems compromises. National security vulnerabilities are literally built into our offensive, defensive and detection systems as economy and competitiveness, not security and performance, are the overarching parameters of Department of Defense supplier participation. In addition, the atmosphere created by the COTS mandate within the U.S. supplier base has led many to ignore the Berry Amendment, which calls for specialty metals critical to national security to be sourced only in the United States.

CONCLUSION:
This scenario is not about fantasy or prediction but practical reasoning and logical deduction. The root causes for failure are real, not imaginary. Weaknesses in our defense industrial base supply chain, dependency on third-party vendors, continual disregard for the Berry Amendment and lack of foresight regarding the interplay between global economy and national security are making the United States unnecessarily vulnerable to a wide range of potential dangers. Even though the threats that will emerge in the future are likely beyond our current commitments and contemplations, it would be a mistake to limit our ideas about the future by the narrow experiences of our past. While it can be dangerous to hold rigid beliefs about tomorrow, preparedness requires seeing possibilities before they become obvious and making wise decisions today.

INTRODUCTION:
The proposed U.S.-Indian civil nuclear cooperation accord represents a transformation in American nuclear nonproliferation policy. By examining the policy shift and the security implications of the proposal, this case study illustrates the challenges of adjusting long-standing policy guidelines to conform to new strategic frameworks. It also provides insight for future interactions in which broader strategic ties and policy goals transcend traditional security issues. The key concern of the proposed U.S.-India nuclear deal—balancing nonproliferation goals with other foreign policy objectives—is one that will remain relevant with respect to India even if the nuclear agreement falls through.

STRATEGY:
In pursuing nuclear cooperation with India, the George W. Bush administration replaced an integrated, long-established strategy that emphasized nonproliferation objectives with a White House-dominated approach that circumvented typical interagency processes. Key officials reversed the Clinton policy, which sought to “cap, roll back, and eliminate” India’s nuclear program. Instead, they promoted an ad hoc approach that employed civilian nuclear cooperation as a means to strengthen U.S.-Indian relations and India’s regional power status. To this end, President Bush waived previously established sanctions stemming from India’s 1998 nuclear test. Beginning in 2001, moreover, U.S. officials engaged in successive rounds of negotiations with their Indian counterparts. Originally confined to defense and technology cooperation, U.S.-Indian discussions towards nuclear cooperation began in earnest in 2005. By March 2006, these talks had culminated in the Bush-Singh Accord, which outlined the foundation of future U.S.-Indian cooperation in civil nuclear energy and dual-use technology.

At this juncture, however, the White House encountered difficulties in its approach to Capital Hill. The administration wanted Congress to exempt India from certain Atomic Energy Act provisions and provide the executive branch with the authority to finalize the cooperation accord without additional congressional action. Yet legislators, many of whom were uncomfortable with the loosely framed provisions of the Bush-Singh agreement, responded by passing the Hyde Act, which required India and the nuclear cooperation accord to adhere to certain conditions before Congress would consider approving a finalized agreement. Though President Bush issued a Presidential Statement limiting Hyde Act restrictions, the pace of U.S.-Indian negotiations slowed and the formal text of the accord was not completed by the U.S. and Indian negotiating teams until mid-2007. The accord’s realization further depends on whether India is able to attain corresponding agreements with international non-proliferation bodies and whether Congress supports the agreement’s final terms.

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
Influential Bush administration officials, including Robert Blackwill, Nicholas Burns, Stephen Hadley, Condoleezza Rice, and other senior policy-makers viewed India as an emerging strategic partner of the United States, including vis-à-vis China. They collaborated across the interagency to advance U.S.-Indian civil nuclear cooperation. Though some policy conflict existed within the administration, the internal dissent was minimized by constricting the decision-making circle. When disagreements did occur—for example, within interagency negotiating teams—the importance senior officials placed on achieving cooperation in a timely manner typically forced consensus. Yet, extensive executive-legislative conflict over the agreement was notable. Members of Congress expressed concerns in particular about the threat the agreement might pose to the global nuclear nonproliferation regime by, for instance, establishing loopholes for other countries to exploit. In contrast, the White House downplayed these nonproliferation risks and remained focused on the strategic importance of strengthening U.S.-Indian relations.

EVALUATION:
The decision to avoid time-consuming but comprehensive analysis at the lower levels of the U.S. foreign policy bureaucracy, the similar geopolitical perspectives of high-level policy-makers, and important personnel and organizational shifts––such as the critical appointment of Condoleezza Rice as Secretary of State––facilitated the U.S. government’s success in uniting the executive branch. Nevertheless, this approach, combined with the administration’s failure to incorporate extensive congressional consultation, has thus far failed to win over many of the deal’s opponents. Lawmakers in Washington and New Delhi still disagree sharply over their preferred approach. The lack of consultation and transparency on the part of the administration appears to have exacerbated congressional reservations regarding the proposed shift in U.S. nonproliferation strategy. Meanwhile, legislative stipulations, as specified in the Hyde Act, have complicated and delayed implementation of the accord by requiring a fragile Indian coalition government to secure approval for an agreement that contains domestically unpalatable requirements.

RESULTS:
The top-down approach of the Bush administration rapidly advanced a transformative agreement that resolved a number of deeply rooted issues that had long complicated U.S. nonproliferation policy toward India. In particular, the approach addressed the issues of safeguards and reprocessing rights, which had been the cause for three decades of U.S.-Indian recrimination. The repeated travel and other exchanges of senior officials between Washington and New Delhi have also forged a link between the two capitals. Thanks to these and other developments, an improved rapport among U.S. and Indian counterparts will likely remain intact even if the deal falls through. Nevertheless, the White House’s strategy may result in the failure to secure congressional approval of the agreement, which could inflict other costs on U.S.-Indian relations and commerce.

CONCLUSION
The case illustrates the difficulties of achieving executive-legislative agreements that entail abrupt changes in U.S. strategies on sensitive national security issues—even when these transformations may be necessary to respond to evolving international threats and opportunities. The study also highlights the tradeoff between achieving executive branch consensus by constraining decision-making and securing wider approval for the resulting policies within the broader U.S. national security system.

INTRODUCTION:
In spring 2007, Andrew Speaker confounded public health, homeland security, customs and border protection, transportation safety, and other federal, state, and local agency officials when, having been diagnosed with a multiple-drug-resistant strain of tuberculosis (MDR-TB), he travelled from Atlanta, Georgia to Paris, Athens, Mykonos Island, Rome, and then returned to the United States by way of Prague, Montreal, and the Champlain, New York border crossing. Speaker’s ability to evade authorities created a sobering awareness of the fault lines in U.S. strategy to contain the global spread of an infectious disease. An examination of the Speaker case, therefore, provides the Project on National Security Reform with key observations regarding U.S. strategy, interagency capabilities, and resources aimed at preventing and containing the emergence and spread of public health risks from natural or deliberate events.

STRATEGY:
Within the United States, there is no national system of public health: the organization, mission, and funding (whether from federal, state, or other sources) of public health is under the authority of the governors of the 50 states. At the federal level, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the Transportation Security Administration, and other key agencies—acting under the guidance of national security framing documents such as Emergency Support Function 8 of the National Response Plan (and now the National Response Framework) and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 21—play a critical role in and share the burden of responsibility for preventing the introduction, transmission, and spread of communicable diseases, such as MDR-TB, across U.S. borders. The Speaker case, however, demonstrated critical seams in this structure, particularly the absence of an integrated strategy for infectious disease detection.

Without such a strategy, health and homeland security processes were implemented in an ad hoc manner during the Speaker response. The principal U.S. agencies involved in the response were slow to recognize the problem and were ineffective in quickly preparing a coherent strategy to manage the Speaker case. They also relied heavily on interpersonal, informal relationships rather than formal processes and mechanisms that might have more rapidly and effectively coordinated response efforts.

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
When Speaker boarded a plane bound for Europe, he left in his wake numerous state, local, and federal health, homeland security, and transportation officials bereft of abilities to communicate, garner consensus, and act decisively to resolve the situation. Untimely, information sharing among local, state, and federal public health authorities caused confusion regarding the nature and risk of Speaker’s disease and delayed prompt and effective medical intervention. These and other shortcomings led to delays in the rapid and effective implementation of appropriate public health strategies that would have minimized the risk of disease transmission.

EVALUATION:
The Speaker case was a public health threat that required a high level of public health decision making, multi-sector support, and coordination with international bodies—all of which were sorely lacking. Failures in interagency communication and coordination, decision making, and understanding of legal policies and protocols for implementing public health control measures; imprecise use of border control watch lists; confusion over jurisdictional and cross-agency standard operating procedures and protocols; inadequately trained and equipped interagency workforces; and ineffective patient risk communication and management policies all contributed to the inefficient implementation of disease control policies and strategies. The Speaker case also demonstrated that the state-based public health sector is inconsistently backed by its federal consultant, the CDC. These difficulties were exacerbated by the fact that public health professionals have little to no experience working collaboratively with the defense, law enforcement, and intelligence sectors.

RESULTS:
The lack of interagency coordination and the overall ineffective response during the Speaker incident not only unnecessarily placed hundreds of individuals at risk of contracting MDR-TB, but also threatened the public’s confidence in the U.S. government’s ability to protect its citizens from public health risks. Trust that American authorities have resolved systemic failures remains low. The absence of an integrated strategy and the failure to establish effective operating procedures also called into question Washington’s commitment, credibility, and ability to fulfill its legal responsibilities under the International Health Regulations (2005) as a World Health Organization member state, thus undermining American prestige and likely America’s ability to ensure other nations’ compliance with regulations and cooperation in dealing with future biological threats. Critically, the Speaker incident heightened international awareness and, it is safe to infer, terrorists’ knowledge of America’s fault lines in dealing with issues at the nexus of health and homeland security. This result could have grave security consequences should those wishing the United States harm successfully exploit these seams in the future.

CONCLUSION:
Despite some recent improvements, the task of preparing the United States for major health emergencies that pose a threat to national security is not nearly done. The epidemiological consequences of the Speaker incident were manageable and have been contained. However, the introduction of a new or emerging communicable disease with higher virulence, infectivity, and pathogenicity—one that presents a novel threat to public health—could place far greater demands on U.S. civil, political, and economic infrastructures and could pose a far more devastating hazard to American national security. Correcting the institutional inefficiencies that are readily apparent in the Speaker case can offer a springboard from which to improve the federal government’s role in preventing and containing the emergence and spread of public health risks.

INTRODUCTION:
The transfer of the United States Information Agency (USIA) into the Department of State (DOS) reorganized U.S. public diplomacy in response to the end of the Cold War. Yet, nearly ten years later, the performance of American public diplomacy is much maligned and reform is again being debated, with presidential candidates and cabinet secretaries calling for change. An examination of the absorption of USIA by DOS therefore provides timely lessons for future interagency organization and public diplomacy strategy development. As such, this examination is important for the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR).

STRATEGY:
In 1995 Senator Jesse Helms initiated comprehensive reorganization of U.S. public diplomacy by introducing legislation which, among other measures, called for the consolidation of USIA into the State Department. In March 1997, the White House backed disestablishing USIA when Secretary of State Madeline Albright and Assistant Secretary of State James Rubin presented USIA Director Joe Duffey and his deputy, Penn Kemble, with a consolidation proposal which the Oval Office hoped to advance within sixty days. USIA leadership promptly registered objections with the content and timeline of the plan but in April, President Clinton introduced an initiative under which USIA and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) would be consolidated into the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) would no longer have budgetary independence from DOS. Under the subsequent authority of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act, which Congress passed and the President signed in 1998, USIA ceased operation as an independent agency in October 1999.

In hindsight, dissolving USIA was not coherent strategy. Public diplomacy practitioners were allowed limited input into the process and there seemed to have been limited exploration of the relevant factors and challenges involved in the absorption of USIA into the State Department. In addition, there was limited cost-benefit analysis of how the change might adversely influence the effectiveness of public diplomacy.

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
Although USIA’s input was essentially set aside in the decision to move USIA into the State Department, the two organizations collaborated reasonably well in implementing the consolidation. In October 1999, USIA’s functions were divided within DOS between the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, the Bureau of International Information Programs, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and the Bureau of Public Affairs. Regional bureaus absorbed all USIA and United States Information Serves (USIS) field staff who became subject to the authority of the relevant Assistant Secretary of State. Though the structure appeared elegant on paper, it did not ensure effective cooperation. Creating unity of purpose proved particularly problematic as former USIA officials were well aware of traditional disdain for public diplomacy within Foggy Bottom.

EVALUATION:
The ill-advised reorganization resulted in part from a profound, long-standing inability of non-public diplomacy agencies to appreciate the significance of public diplomacy and allow USIA a seat at the table of policy formation. Within DOS, integration has been undermined by the distinct organizational cultures of DOS and USIA and by the imperfect authorities of the new public diplomacy structure. Charging the undersecretary with responsibility for public affairs and public diplomacy has further complicated strategic direction as the pressures of short-term public affairs inevitably trump longer-term public diplomacy activities. Finally, as ever, public diplomacy at DOS has suffered from staffing, training, and funding insufficiencies.

RESULTS:
U.S. public diplomacy in its new institutional home has not been able to effectively fight the war of ideas. In this context, the true costs of restructuring are perhaps best measured in historic public diplomacy deficiencies that were no addressed by restructuring. These include an absence of provisions to ensure interagency coordination; the lack of a USG-wide definition of “public diplomacy” itself; insufficient resourcing; inadequate roles for research and evaluation in communication outreach and for the private sector; obsolete regulations; and no unifying strategic framework for public diplomacy initiatives.

CONCLUSION:
An investigation of the reconstitution of USIA within DOS illustrates the tenacity of agency-specific cultures, the importance of institutional authorities, and the incidence of non-consultation in USG restructuring. Above all, however, the precipitous reorganization points to consistent undervaluation of the public diplomacy function within the U.S. national security system.

INTRODUCTION:
During the 1994 Rwanda genocide, killers with machetes moved more rapidly and with greater unity of effort than did the U.S. national security system. Despite successive regional crises and ample warning that acts of genocide were likely in the country, Washington was unprepared. Once the genocide began on April 6, 1994, the United States and the United Nations stood by as the highly organized Interahamwe militias and the Hutu Power movement killed an estimated 800,000 people in 100 days. Meanwhile, the divided U.S. interagency sputtered along, not approving even a minimally proactive course of action and taking two months to authorize the use of the word “genocide” to describe what was occurring in Rwanda. Within days of the start of the killing, the U.S. embassy was closed and all Americans were evacuated from the country. Within a few weeks, with the United States in the lead, the Security Council voted to pull out most U.N. forces in the country. Eventually, an army of exiled Tutsis ended the genocide with little aid from a second U.N. force, which arrived after most of the killing had occurred. The most appropriate American response would come four years later when President Bill Clinton apologized to Rwanda for Washington’s failure.

STRATEGY:
This study reveals that Washington failed to develop a national security strategy in the early 1990s that explicitly, or even implicitly, provided guidance on how the United States should respond to genocide. Instead, the relevant governing strategy, Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25, created and codified through a flawed process, hindered the development of an effective course of action and stymied even small, ad hoc responses. No aspect of American power—diplomatic, military, economic, informational, or moral—was leveraged to stem the genocide and the National Security Council principals never met to discuss the genocide and the proper U.S. role. Over the course of April and May 1994, the U.S. government ineptly attempted to make decisions to jam hate radio broadcasts, authorize a new U.N. force, and, once approved on May 17, equip that force. In the absence of interagency agreement, the U.S. de facto policy was inaction. In fact, avoiding action became a goal in itself, an objective that was easily supported by the consensus driven national security process that predominated in the 1990s.

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
The Departments of State and Defense, the White House, and the National Security Council did not work together to craft a response to the crisis and with no tangible strategy to execute, coordinated strategy implementation was hardly an issue. Given the lack of high-level interest in forming a Rwanda policy (as military intervention was ruled out), mid- and low-level officials were left to form and implement a strategy, something which they lacked the authority to accomplish. Thus, even small activities that might have reduced the killing were unable to be agreed or acted upon. The one measure that was approved mid-way through the genocide, the provision of 50 armored personal carriers to support a peacekeeping force, was implemented so inefficiently that the killing was complete by the time the vehicles arrived in Rwanda.

EVALUATION:
The weakness of the U.S. response to the genocide can be summarized simply: The mechanistic nature of U.S. national security structures and processes enabled a small group to control the pace of decision making through bureaucratic, legal and semantic manipulations. This was not entirely malicious; officials were justifiably anxious about any U.S. intervention and the political climate was averse to peacekeeping. In many ways, these individuals were just doing their jobs, attending meetings and filing reports. Organizational preferences also played an important role in preventing the U.S. government from agreeing on a strategy. PDD 25 facilitated this lethargic response but was not solely responsible for U.S. inaction. For those fearful of the Somalia syndrome, wary of the slippery slope, insistent on diplomatic solutions, or otherwise opposed to intervention in Rwanda, the national security system proved an effective tool to ensure inaction because it relied heavily on a slow interagency process which favored consensus over clear, quick action.

RESULTS:
The cost of the failure to prevent, halt, or stem the genocide in Rwanda can be debated. There is no doubt that in terms of traditional interests, the genocide posed little direct risk to U.S. economic or security concerns. However, the disruptions caused by the tragedy spilled over into neighboring countries, the Democratic Republic of the Congo in particular, where a war from 1998-2003 involved six nations and killed more than 3 million. This instability, which continues at present, is clearly not in the interests of a world power, such as the United States. It can be argued that an even greater cost of U.S. inaction was a loss of American moral authority. In addition, the genocide encouraged a global culture of impunity that allows crimes against humanity to occur. This case study illustrates that genocidal events cannot simply be ignored. Inhumanity and volatility, no matter where they occur, can pour over borders, damage international markets, sow violence, and metastasize.

CONCLUSION:
Given the continuing possibility of genocidal violence not only in the Great Lakes region of Africa but globally, a discussion of genocide prevention’s place within the national security architecture of the United States is essential. Without a pre-determined decision on whether intervention to halt egregious human rights violations is within the national interests of the United States, the national security apparatus floundered when faced with the Rwanda genocide. No strategy was created. Instead, interagency discussions were drawn out until a U.S. response became a nonissue. The U.S. government interagency system was and remains incapable of quickly creating an agreed-upon, effective strategy in the face of such immense and near-unimaginable events.

INTRODUCTION:
The Clinton administration’s Russia policy specifically empowered a vice president, Al Gore, to play a leading foreign policy role through the Bi-National Commission on Economic and Technological Cooperation, which Gore co-chaired with the Russian Prime Minister. Gore’s important function within the national security process, administering a major, high profile national security program, was a significant moment in the continuing evolution of the vice president’s office, which over the past 60 years has changed from a mere afterthought (once referred to as a Constitutional appendix) to a power-base in its own right. Vice President Gore’s role in the U.S.-Russian bilateral commissions provides an important glimpse into both a high profile foreign policy initiative and into the dynamics of a prominent vice presidential role in national security affairs.

STRATEGY:
The idea for a new forum to increase U.S.-Russia cooperation was initially developed in a 1993 meeting between Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev and Strobe Talbott (Ambassador to the Newly Independent States, and the Clinton administration’s point-person on Russia policy). After Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton approved the idea, Vice President Gore and Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin agreed to be co-chairs and the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, or GCC was established. The GCC and its successor commissions were an attempt to establish a stronger and more systematic U.S.-Russian relationship by creating an ongoing process to address a variety of problems as they arose.

The Commission was also a unique, but creative use of the vice presidency. The prestige of the vice presidency had, in the past, made the vice president useful in representing the United States abroad but for most of American history, the vice president acted in a primarily ceremonial capacity. By contrast, the GCC was an active political assignment that also required the vice president’s prestige in order to build a new working relationship with Russia.

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
The GCC involved the cooperation of multiple cabinet departments and other agencies. Coordination was not always successful. At the policy level, there were instances of tension between the State and Treasury Departments over the impact of economic reforms on political stability; the vice president sided publicly with the State Department. At the bureacratic level, some agencies resisted cooperating with GCC programs. In particular, the U.S. Agency for International Developement (USAID), which was criticized heavily for its initiatives in Russia, saw GCC activities as an intrusion in its affairs. In other cases, because of the vice president’s prominent role in the administration, the GCC pre-empted agency endeavors and the inter-agency process. However, when compared to the instances of other active vice presidents who assumed a line assignment, the turf battles surrounding the GCC were relatively small.

EVALUATION:
A vice president brings a combination of inherent strengths and weaknesses to any major foreign policy line assignment. One weakness is limited staff resources, which for Gore meant that the GCC had no dedicated personnel and was primarily staffed from other agencies by personnel with other duties. Vice presidents also lack formal executive authority, thereby exacerbating staffing and other management problems. In addition, when a vice president plays a prominent advisory role (as Gore did for Clinton) a major line assignment can distract from this responsibility. Gore’s chairmanship of the GCC, and his de facto investment in the GCC’s public success, reduced his ability to serve as an honest broker and/or disinterested observer of Clinton’s Russia policy. However, Gore’s participation in the GCC endowed the Commission with vice presidential prominence and demonstrated both to Moscow and to the world that Russian-American relations were a high priority for the Clinton administration.

RESULTS:
Gore’s GCC had some important successes, particularly on Russian-American security issues. In other areas, such as economic development and democratization, the record was mixed. It is possible that better staffing and coordination could have helped foster more effective aid policies to assist Russian development. Perhaps most importantly, the American sponsored aid and economic reform packages became heavily associated with Russian corruption and the rise of Russian oligarch capitalists, to the enduring detriment of American prestige within Russia.

CONCLUSION:
Overall, the GCC and its successor commissions fulfilled their intended purpose of creating a new mechanism for managing Russian-American relations at the end of the Cold War. Appointing the vice president and the Russian Prime Minister as co-chairs helped establish high-level channels for U.S.-Russian discussions and ensure that the GCC became a serious conduit for negotiations. Nevertheless, though the GCC demonstrates that it might be possible for a careful vice president to manage a line assignment without excessive bureacratic struggles, institutional Gore’s experience with the GCC still also underscores enduring instituational weaknesses associated with vice presidential administration of specific policies or programs.