INTRODUCTION:
U.S. planning for the occupation of Japan after WWII is an example of successful integration of the government’s military and civilian assets to create a practical strategy for reform and reconstruction of an occupied territory. The approach to planning between 1941 and 1945 evolved from ad hoc responses to crisis into a formal and forward looking interagency organization. Though constant tension existed between military and civilian officials, the immensity of the nation-building task convinced all involved of the need for cooperation. The case is important to the Project on National Security Reform because the way in which the U.S. Government planned for the political and economic transformation of Japan illustrates how military and civilian agencies can create cohesive, effective and flexible strategy.

STRATEGY:
The interagency strategic and tactical approach was conceived by an organization known as the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), the authoritative policymaking organ for postwar reconstruction projects. The interagency deliberative process was vested with the authority of the president and relevant secretaries, and relied on information transparency and close working relationships at all levels. In the rare instances when SWNCC could not reach a consensus, cases advanced to the President for a final decision, leading to a unified policy emerging from the agencies and fully sanctioned by the White House.

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
Prior to the advent of SWNCC, Secretary of War Henry Stimson had organized an informal group composed of himself, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Navy. These men—known as the “Committee of Three”—met weekly to resolve interagency problems. The Committee lacked executive authority, instead serving an essentially advisory function, and identifying issues for President Roosevelt’s consideration.

During this period, Secretary of State Hull had been given primary responsibility for all postwar planning, and under Roosevelt’s orders, State began considering the problem of occupation just weeks after Pearl Harbor. The process reached its full scope and depth over the next several years. On 28 December 1941, the president established an Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy. However, a lack of senior level agreement as to the Committee’s mission meant pieces of the plan were being developed in a variety of government offices. There was no strategic architecture that might have permitted the creation of practical and actionable policies endorsed by the entire government. Without integration, it was inevitable that parochial interests (turf, budget, careers) would present problems.

In 1944, newly-appointed Secretary of State Edward Stettinius sent a letter to Secretary Stimson and Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, formally proposing that the Committee of Three create a jointly managed secretariat to plan the occupations and fully integrate U.S. foreign policy. The SWNCC was officially constituted on December 9th and was structured and run in such a way as to ensure that group members worked as equals to create policy.

EVALUATION:
Nearly all SWNCC decisions became the official U.S. policy of the occupation, guiding the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (SCAP) General Douglas MacArthur and his staff. These handbooks, orders and objectives were prepared to address the expected situation on the ground. When U.S. forces arrived in late August 1945, SCAP was armed with the information necessary to act effectively in and adapt quickly to the chaotic postwar environment.

SWNCC’s most valuable output was a coherent set of objectives that provided a flexible action script for the occupation. The most important points – the preservation of the institution of Emperor, retaining the existing government apparatus, defining the rights of all citizens, and the reformation of land tenure – were implemented within a few months of MacArthur’s arrival, and formed the economic and social foundation of a stable post-conflict environment that persists today.

RESULTS:
In reviewing the interagency process during World War II, one analyst points out three key features: “senior leader involvement, sustained interaction, and thorough integration” of policy at or below the level of Assistant Secretary. Planning for the occupation of Japan using the SWNCC was successful because it provided a forum for the formation of interagency relationships, incorporated experts from across the government, and integrated their outputs into sanctioned national policy. The quality of the interagency process during this period is demonstrated by the fact that of the 750 issues considered by the SWNCC before the National Security Act of 1947, only 6 cases were forwarded to the President for final resolution.

CONCLUSION:
The U.S. approach to Japan’s postwar reconstruction evolved as a response to perceived ineffectiveness in policy implementation. Ultimately though, the United States, through SWNCC’s interagency process, helped transform Japan from a pre-modern, semi-feudal nation into a modern, democratic capitalist state. The work of a relatively small group of military and civilian bureaucrats, led by political and military elites who cooperated closely in pursuit of common objectives, proved essential for achieving this change.