INTRODUCTION:

The Clinton administration’s Russia policy specifically empowered a vice president, Al Gore, to play a leading foreign policy role through the Bi-National Commission on Economic and Technological Cooperation, which Gore co-chaired with the Russian Prime Minister. Gore’s important function within the national security process, administering a major, high profile national security program, was a significant moment in the continuing evolution of the vice president’s office, which over the past 60 years has changed from a mere afterthought (once referred to as a Constitutional appendix) to a power-base in its own right. Vice President Gore’s role in the U.S.-Russian bilateral commissions provides an important glimpse into both a high profile foreign policy initiative and into the dynamics of a prominent vice presidential role in national security affairs. 

STRATEGY:

The idea for a new forum to increase U.S.-Russia cooperation was initially developed in a 1993 meeting between Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev and Strobe Talbott (Ambassador to the Newly Independent States, and the Clinton administration’s point-person on Russia policy). After Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton approved the idea, Vice President Gore and Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin agreed to be co-chairs and the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, or GCC was established. The GCC and its successor commissions were an attempt to establish a stronger and more systematic U.S.-Russian relationship by creating an ongoing process to address a variety of problems as they arose.

The Commission was also a unique, but creative use of the vice presidency. The prestige of the vice presidency had, in the past, made the vice president useful in representing the United States abroad but for most of American history, the vice president acted in a primarily ceremonial capacity. By contrast, the GCC was an active political assignment that also required the vice president’s prestige in order to build a new working relationship with Russia.

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:

The GCC involved the cooperation of multiple cabinet departments and other agencies. Coordination was not always successful. At the policy level, there were instances of tension between the State and Treasury Departments over the impact of economic reforms on political stability; the vice president sided publicly with the State Department. At the bureacratic level, some agencies resisted cooperating with GCC programs. In particular, the U.S. Agency for International Developement (USAID), which was criticized heavily for its initiatives in Russia, saw GCC activities as an intrusion in its affairs. In other cases, because of the vice president’s prominent role in the administration, the GCC pre-empted agency endeavors and the inter-agency process. However, when compared to the instances of other active vice presidents who assumed a line assignment, the turf battles surrounding the GCC were relatively small. 

EVALUATION:

A vice president brings a combination of inherent strengths and weaknesses to any major foreign policy line assignment. One weakness is limited staff resources, which for Gore meant that the GCC had no dedicated personnel and was primarily staffed from other agencies by personnel with other duties. Vice presidents also lack formal executive authority, thereby exacerbating staffing and other management problems. In addition, when a vice president plays a prominent advisory role (as Gore did for Clinton) a major line assignment can distract from this responsibility. Gore’s chairmanship of the GCC, and his de facto investment in the GCC’s public success, reduced his ability to serve as an honest broker and/or disinterested observer of Clinton’s Russia policy. However, Gore’s participation in the GCC endowed the Commission with vice presidential prominence and demonstrated both to Moscow and to the world that Russian-American relations were a high priority for the Clinton administration. 

RESULTS:

Gore’s GCC had some important successes, particularly on Russian-American security issues. In other areas, such as economic development and democratization, the record was mixed. It is possible that better staffing and coordination could have helped foster more effective aid policies to assist Russian development. Perhaps most importantly, the American sponsored aid and economic reform packages became heavily associated with Russian corruption and the rise of Russian oligarch capitalists, to the enduring detriment of American prestige within Russia.

CONCLUSION:

Overall, the GCC and its successor commissions fulfilled their intended purpose of creating a new mechanism for managing Russian-American relations at the end of the Cold War. Appointing the vice president and the Russian Prime Minister as co-chairs helped establish high-level channels for U.S.-Russian discussions and ensure that the GCC became a serious conduit for negotiations. Nevertheless, though the GCC demonstrates that it might be possible for a careful vice president to manage a line assignment without excessive bureacratic struggles, institutional Gore’s experience with the GCC still also underscores enduring instituational weaknesses associated with vice presidential administration of specific policies or programs.