Failures at the Nexus of Health and Homeland Security: The 2007 Andrew Speaker Case - Elin Gursky and Sweta Batni

INTRODUCTION:
In spring 2007, Andrew Speaker confounded public health, homeland security, customs and border protection, transportation safety, and other federal, state, and local agency officials when, having been diagnosed with a multiple-drug-resistant strain of tuberculosis (MDR-TB), he travelled from Atlanta, Georgia to Paris, Athens, Mykonos Island, Rome, and then returned to the United States by way of Prague, Montreal, and the Champlain, New York border crossing. Speaker’s ability to evade authorities created a sobering awareness of the fault lines in U.S. strategy to contain the global spread of an infectious disease. An examination of the Speaker case, therefore, provides the Project on National Security Reform with key observations regarding U.S. strategy, interagency capabilities, and resources aimed at preventing and containing the emergence and spread of public health risks from natural or deliberate events. 

STRATEGY:
Within the United States, there is no national system of public health: the organization, mission, and funding (whether from federal, state, or other sources) of public health is under the authority of the governors of the 50 states. At the federal level, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the Transportation Security Administration, and other key agencies—acting under the guidance of national security framing documents such as Emergency Support Function 8 of the National Response Plan (and now the National Response Framework) and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 21—play a critical role in and share the burden of responsibility for preventing the introduction, transmission, and spread of communicable diseases, such as MDR-TB, across U.S. borders. The Speaker case, however, demonstrated critical seams in this structure, particularly the absence of an integrated strategy for infectious disease detection.

Without such a strategy, health and homeland security processes were implemented in an ad hoc manner during the Speaker response. The principal U.S. agencies involved in the response were slow to recognize the problem and were ineffective in quickly preparing a coherent strategy to manage the Speaker case. They also relied heavily on interpersonal, informal relationships rather than formal processes and mechanisms that might have more rapidly and effectively coordinated response efforts. 

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
When Speaker boarded a plane bound for Europe, he left in his wake numerous state, local, and federal health, homeland security, and transportation officials bereft of abilities to communicate, garner consensus, and act decisively to resolve the situation. Untimely, information sharing among local, state, and federal public health authorities caused confusion regarding the nature and risk of Speaker’s disease and delayed prompt and effective medical intervention. These and other shortcomings led to delays in the rapid and effective implementation of appropriate public health strategies that would have minimized the risk of disease transmission. 

EVALUATION:
The Speaker case was a public health threat that required a high level of public health decision making, multi-sector support, and coordination with international bodies—all of which were sorely lacking. Failures in interagency communication and coordination, decision making, and understanding of legal policies and protocols for implementing public health control measures; imprecise use of border control watch lists; confusion over jurisdictional and cross-agency standard operating procedures and protocols; inadequately trained and equipped interagency workforces; and ineffective patient risk communication and management policies all contributed to the inefficient implementation of disease control policies and strategies. The Speaker case also demonstrated that the state-based public health sector is inconsistently backed by its federal consultant, the CDC. These difficulties were exacerbated by the fact that public health professionals have little to no experience working collaboratively with the defense, law enforcement, and intelligence sectors.

RESULTS:
The lack of interagency coordination and the overall ineffective response during the Speaker incident not only unnecessarily placed hundreds of individuals at risk of contracting MDR-TB, but also threatened the public’s confidence in the U.S. government’s ability to protect its citizens from public health risks. Trust that American authorities have resolved systemic failures remains low. The absence of an integrated strategy and the failure to establish effective operating procedures also called into question Washington’s commitment, credibility, and ability to fulfill its legal responsibilities under the International Health Regulations (2005) as a World Health Organization member state, thus undermining American prestige and likely America’s ability to ensure other nations’ compliance with regulations and cooperation in dealing with future biological threats. Critically, the Speaker incident heightened international awareness and, it is safe to infer, terrorists’ knowledge of America’s fault lines in dealing with issues at the nexus of health and homeland security. This result could have grave security consequences should those wishing the United States harm successfully exploit these seams in the future.

CONCLUSION:
Despite some recent improvements, the task of preparing the United States for major health emergencies that pose a threat to national security is not nearly done. The epidemiological consequences of the Speaker incident were manageable and have been contained. However, the introduction of a new or emerging communicable disease with higher virulence, infectivity, and pathogenicity—one that presents a novel threat to public health—could place far greater demands on U.S. civil, political, and economic infrastructures and could pose a far more devastating hazard to American national security. Correcting the institutional inefficiencies that are readily apparent in the Speaker case can offer a springboard from which to improve the federal government’s role in preventing and containing the emergence and spread of public health risks. 




  Major Reports
  Case Studies
The NCIX and the National Counterintelligence Mission - Michelle Van Cleave
Managing U.S.-China Crises - Richard Weitz
Choosing War: An Analysis of the Decision to Invade Iraq - Joseph J. Collins
Response to Influenza Pandemic of 1918-1919 - John Shortal, Center of Military History
Public Diplomacy and Psychological Operations (Cold War) - Carnes Lord, Naval War College
CORDS and the Vietnam Experience - Richard W. Stewart, Center of Military History
1964 Alaskan Earthquake - Dwight A. Ink
East Timor, 1999 - Richard Weitz
The Interagency, Eisenhower, and the House of Saud - Christine R. Gilbert
Human Trafficking in the 21st Century - Daniel R. Langberg
America's Rejection of the Ottawa Treaty - Dennis Barlow
Japan after WWII - Peter F. Schaefer and P. Clayton Schaefer
Somalia: Did Leaders or the System Fail? - Christopher J. Lamb with Nicholas J. Moon
Iran-Contra Affair - Alex Douville
U.S. - Central Asian Engagement - Evan Minsberg
Interagency Paralysis: Stagnation in Bosnia and Kosovo - Vicki J. Rast and Dylan Lee Lehrke
U.S. Interagency Efforts to Combat International Terrorism Through Foreign Capacity Building Programs - Celina B. Realuyo and Michael B. Kraft
Future Defense Industry Scenario - Sheila Ronis
U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement - Patrick Mendis and Leah Green
Failures at the Nexus of Health and Homeland Security: The 2007 Andrew Speaker Case - Elin Gursky and Sweta Batni
The Crisis in U.S. Public Diplomacy: The Demise of USIA - Juliana Geran Pilon and Nicholas J. Cull
The Banality of the Interagency: U.S. Inaction in the Rwanda Genocide - Dylan Lee Lehrke
The Vice President and Foreign Policy: From "the most insignificant office" to Gore as Russia Czar - Aaron Mannes, University of Maryland
The Asian Financial Crisis: Managing Complex Threats to Global Economic Stability - Rozlyn Engel
Building and Maintaining the Gulf War Coalition - Ryan Arant
The 2002 Coup Attempt against Hugo Chavez - Tristan Abbey
The Carter Administration and the Iranian Hostage Crisis Rescue Mission - Jay Bachar
The 1998 Bombings of the United States Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania: The Failure to Prevent and Effectively Respond to an Act of Terrorism - Allison Bukowski
Countering Iran's Nuclear Ambitions, 2002-2008 - Jamie Boulding
The 2003 U.S. Intervention in Liberia - Henrik Bliddal
Pre-9/11 Intelligence and the Creation of the Director of National Intelligence - Jessie Daniels
"Improvising Furiously": The Effort to Train Iraq's Police - Thomas Dybicz
U.S. Counter-Terrorism Operations in Somalia and the Horn of Africa, Post-2001 - Paul Delventhal
The U.S. Role in the Northern Ireland Peace Process - Jessie Daniels
U.S. Strategy in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict - Irina Ghaplanyan
U.S. Interagency Response to the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami - Carlene Gong
The Andean Initiative and the Transnational Social Contract, 1989-1994 - Daniel Gibbons
The Reagan Administration's Response to the Crisis in Lebanon - Aref N. Hassan
Establishing U.S. Africa Command - Kimberly Nastasi Klein
SALT I: A Lesson in Security Policy - Matthew P. Jennings
U.S. Response to the 2001 Anthrax Incidents - Erin C. Hoffman
Integrating Civilian and Military Efforts in Provincial Reconstruction Teams - David Kobayashi
Losing Iran: The Accidental Abandonment of an Ally through Interagency Failure - Jesse Paul Lehrke
The Berlin Blockade: A First Test for the National Security Act - Sebastian Lederer
The Counternarcotics Effort in Afghanistan - Matthew Korade
U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Middle East after 9/11 - Justin Logan
The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), NSPD 44, DOD Directive 3000.05 - Christopher D. Mallard
HIV/AIDS Mitigation Efforts in Africa and U.S. National Security Policy: An Analysis of the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) - Devin J. Lynch
The Role of the National Security Adviser and NSC in the Establishment of Relations with the People's Republic of China - Todd Lorimor
Balancing Democracy Promotion and the Global War on Terror in Pakistan - Don Rassler
Countering Terrorist Financing - Christopher J. Lamb with Alexandra A. Singer
Reversing the Revolution: U.S. Intervention in Guatemala in 1954 - Carolyn R. Schintzius
Reaction to Sputnik under the Eisenhower Administration - Brett Swaney
Bay of Pigs Debacle: Failed Interaction of the Intelligence Community and the Executive - Taylor V. Smith
Brinkmanship in the Straits: The 1995-1996 China-Taiwan Missile Crisis - Hsueh-Ting Wu
The Gulf of Tonkin Incident - Jessica D. Tacka
North Korea's Nuclear Programs and American Policy Formation - Alexander von Rosenbach
The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Close Call Avoided by Successful Strategizing - Rebecca White
Operation Urgent Fury: The 1983 U.S. Intervention in Grenada - Joseph Washecheck
Civil-Military Coordination and the 1994 Intervention in Haiti - William K. Warriner
U.S. Response to Humanitarian Disaster: Hurricane Mitch in Central America - David Wrathall
The Kennedy Administration and American Military Assistance to Laos - Christine Gilbert
Promises and Pitfalls of the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace - Panayotis A. Yannakogeorgos
Global Warming and National Security - Tianchi Wu
The Suez Crisis: Fighting the Cold War in the Middle East - Marianna I. Gurtovnik
The Bush Administration's Democracy Promotion Efforts in Egypt - Edmund LaCour
The 1970s Energy Crisis and National Energy Policy Creation - Dylan Lee Lehrke
U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy Meets the Pakistani Weapons Program - Edward A. Corcoran
An Analysis of Counterterror Practice Failure: The Case of the Fadlallah Assassination Attempt - Richard Chasdi
  Other Publications
  Reform Resources

 
 
Home :: Project Overview :: People :: News Room :: Reports :: Literature :: Join Us :: Site Map
© 2010 Copyright Project on National Security Reform. All Rights Reserved.
Site Designed By: DC Web Designers, a Washington DC Web Design Company