U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation
By Patrick Mendhis, PhD, and Leah Green

Thursday, July16, 2008 at 3:00 p.m.
Hudson Institute, Inc.
1015th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC, 20005

The proposed U.S.-Indian civil nuclear cooperation accord represents a transformation in American nuclear nonproliferation policy.  By examining the policy shift and the security implications of the proposal, this case study illustrates the challenges of adjusting long-standing policy guidelines to conform with new strategic frameworks.  It also provides insight for future interactions in which broader strategic ties and policy goals transcend traditional security concerns.  The key concern of the proposed U.S.-India nuclear deal—balancing nonproliferation goals with other foreign policy objectives—is one that will remain relevant with respect to India even if the nuclear agreement falls through. 

By Hudson scholars Joyce van de Bildt and Monika Rimmele

Wednesday, June 4, 2008; 2:30 PM – 4:00 PM
Hudson Institute, Betsy and Walter Stern Conference Center
1015 15th Street, N.W., 6th Floor
Washington, D.C. 20005

This case study investigates the U.S. government's post-Cold War NATO strategy under the Clinton Administration. The issue of whether to enlarge NATO led to one of the most intense and extensive interagency debates in U.S. history. The topic became embedded in a larger debate over how to transform and modernize the Alliance in order to adapt the organization to the post-Cold War world. The questions of whether to expand the Alliance further, as well as how to ensure NATO's continued viability, remain central to U.S. national security.

Hudson Institute, Betsy and Walter Stern Conference Center
1015 15th Street, N.W., 6th Floor
Washington, D.C. 20005

The Pakistani nuclear weapons development program spanned a period of fifty turbulent years during which U.S. relations with Pakistan varied widely.  One constant, however, was that Washington's reactions to Pakistani nuclear developments regularly lacked a coordinated strategy.  This case study illustrates the difficulties the U.S. government encountered in formulating and implementing an effective policy to prevent Pakistan from developing nuclear weapons.

By Professor Nicholas J. Cull, University of Southern California, and Professor Juliana Geran Pilon, Institute of World Politics and National Defense University.

Tuesday, May 6, 2008; 2:30 PM – 4 PM
Hudson Institute, Betsy and Walter Stern Conference Center
1015 15th Street, N.W., 6th Floor
Washington, D.C. 20005

This case study reviews the decision to eliminate the U.S. Information Agency in 1999, which left unresolved a host of serious problems within the U.S. interagency and weakened American public diplomacy after the Cold War. Winning the war on terror requires an effective U.S. strategic communication strategy to engage global publics and fight the battle of ideas.

Wednesday, April 30, 2008; 2:30 PM - 4:00 PM
Hudson Institute, Betsy and Walter Stern Conference Center
1015 15th Street, N.W., 6th Floor
Washington, D.C. 20005

In this future scenario, hypothetical Chinese aggression towards Taiwan provokes a Sino-U.S. military confrontation.  Initially, the technologically superior and network-centric American military is quickly devastated by the Chinese' ability to activate imbedded programming in small electronic connectors.  This process effectively neutralizes the defense, attack, and navigation capabilities within every system on U.S. warships, submarines, and aircraft.  Because Beijing controls two-thirds of the world's supply of these seemingly harmless connective devices, the Chinese are able to deliberately and strategically infiltrate the U.S. military and industrial base and target four of the military's primary weapons systems programs. The purpose of this scenario is to expose flaws and weaknesses within the current U.S. national security apparatus.  It calls attention to potential dangers of overlooking current weaknesses in the U.S. defense industrial base and global supply chain.  The text also highlights the importance of evaluating assumptions and continually assessing novel events.

Monday, April 28, 2008; 9:00 AM - 10:30 AM
Hudson Institute, Betsy and Walter Stern Conference Center
1015 15th Street, N.W., 6th Floor
Washington, D.C. 20005

This case study for the PNSR reviews the formation and implementation of U.S. strategies in Central Asia since the events of September 11, 2001. The U.S. relationship with this important region has been complicated. The U.S. Government has sought to achieve multiple goals, often with conflicting approaches, in energy, regional security and democracy promotion. American policies in Central Asia have experienced both successes and setbacks. Recurring problems have included shifting U.S. priorities, mixed signals, and poor policy integration.

Monday, April 7, 2008; 9:00-11:00 AM
Hudson Institute, Betsy and Walter Stern Conference Center
1015 15th Street, N.W., 6th Floor
Washington, D.C. 20005

This case study for the PNSR outlines how the United States chose to go to war in Iraq and how its decision making process functioned.  The central finding of this study is that U.S. efforts in Iraq were hobbled by a set of faulty assumptions, a flawed planning effort, and a continuing inability to create security conditions in Iraq that could have fostered meaningful advances in stabilization, reconstruction, and governance.  With the best of intentions, the United States toppled a vile, dangerous regime but has been unable to replace it with a stable entity.  Even allowing for progress under the Surge, the study insists that mistakes in the Iraq operation cry out in the mid- to long-term for improvements in the U.S. decision making and policy execution systems.

Managing U.S.-China Crises
By Richard Weitz, Hudson Senior Fellow and head of the PNSR Case Studies Working Group.

Monday, March 24, 2008; 10:15-11:30 AM
Hudson Institute, Betsy and Walter Stern Conference Center, 6th floor Auditorium
1015 15th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20005

This case study examines the formation and implementation of U.S. policies in response to three national security crises between the United States and the People's Republic of China: (1) the June 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown; (2) the May 1999 Belgrade Embassy Bombing; and (3) the April 2001 EP-3 collision. Three considerations make the study useful for the PNSR. First, managing the security relationship with the China has been, and will probably remain for at least several decades, one of the U.S. government's most important national security mission areas. Second, assessing the U.S. interagency response to several short-term incidents that share common characteristics illuminates how U.S. national security agencies react to acute and unexpected crises of significant importance to the international security environment. Third, although the three specific incidents under consideration deal with U.S.-Chinese security relations, each example differs sufficiently to allow for a richer evaluation of how the U.S. national security agencies respond to international crises than that provided by a single assessment. Each incident occurred under a different administration, whose disparate views about China affected how they organized, developed, and implemented U.S security policies towards China.

In the inter-war period, the U.S. military had modest means and goals. After Pearl Harbor, all U.S. national security institutions experienced rapid transformation, which culminated in the National Security Act of 1947. During this period, the military and civilian national security establishment evolved dramatically and, for the first time in U.S. history, included planning for war and peace simultaneously. The Franklin D. Roosevelt administration undertook an orderly effort to plan the postwar occupation of the Axis countries. The evolution of the structure and function of this post-WWII effort directly influenced the formulation or conceptualization of the National Security Act. This progression is instructive as much for the initial failures as for the ultimate success. Both these success and failures have direct parallels with our current experience in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In 1956, U.S. policymakers saw American objectives in the Middle East foundering in the face of Arab nationalism and Soviet influence in the region.  To resuscitate the government's agenda, President Eisenhower looked to Saudi Arabia. From mid-1956 through 1957, the president spearheaded an administration effort to make King Saud of Saudi Arabia a preeminent leader and ally in the Middle East.  Though overshadowed by the Suez Crisis and the promulgation of the Eisenhower Doctrine, the U.S. strategy toward King Saud was a notable part of greater U.S. regional policy and also marked a critical turning point in the United States relationship with Saudi Arabia.  Yet, by the close of 1957, American aims remained unrealized despite steadfast, empowered implementation. This case study investigates this outcome as well as the bureaucratic development, implementation, and flaws of the King Saud strategy.  In conducting this examination, the study attempts to distill the interagency and other variables that brought about the adoption of an inherently incoherent strategy in the context of the highly structured processes of the Eisenhower-era national security apparatus.

By COL (ret) Dennis Barlow, Director of the Mine Action Information Center at James Madison University.

Friday, December 14, 2007; 2:30-4pm
Hudson Institute, Betsy and Walter Stern Conference Center, 6th floor Auditorium
1015 15th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20005.

In summer of 1994, President Clinton continued a trend among American political leaders as he called for the eventual elimination of anti-personnel landmines (APL). By the winter of 1997, the so-called "Ottawa Treaty" to ban landmines had been signed by 122 nations, with Washington watching from the outside. Many U.S. officials were not only embarrassed by the absence of an American signature, but also surprised by the way the United States it had become isolated in the process. How is it that the country that had provided so much impetus to highly successful arms control venues, and which had taken the morale high ground on this very issue, found itself in such a situation? Was it an indication of an interagency process unsuited for a world in which middle power nations and NGOs share power? Was it the result of a press and public focused on celebrity based sound bites at the expense of solid and complex diplomacy? Was it a White House gaffe caused by the vacillations of a President reluctant to do battle with the Pentagon? Or was it perhaps not a diplomatic failure at all, but a public relations anomaly? What caused the debacle and what can we learn from it?  This case study identifies the key events which defined the U.S. landmine policy position and analyses the effects of that process.

U.S.-Australian Decision-Making Regarding East Timor, 1999
By: Richard Weitz, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute

November 1, 2007, 2:30 PM - 4:00 PM
Hudson Institute, Washington, D.C. Headquarters
1015 15th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20005.

This case investigates the international response to the events in East Timor in 1999 to evaluate the U.S. government's response to the crisis.  In analyzing American actions, the study pays special attention to U.S.-Australian cooperation on East Timor since Australian engagement proved critical in the resolution of the crisis.  The analysis first depicts the situation in Indonesia and East Timor in the late 1990s.  It also describes relations between the United States and Indonesia as well as Australian-Indonesian relations.  The paper then reviews U.S. and Australian actions before, during, and after violence erupted in the territory between pro- and anti-independence forces.  Despite early confusion and later disputes between Washington and Canberra over the appropriate response to the crisis, especially over the degree of support provided by the United States, the two countries ultimately cooperated to organize an Australian-led military intervention supported logistically by the U.S. armed forces.  The conclusion evaluates the performance of the U.S. interagency process and suggests lessons for improving future U.S. military involvement in multinational peace operations and humanitarian interventions.

Asian Financial Crisis (1997–1998)
By Roz Engel, Assistant Professor of Economics, Department of Social Sciences, U.S. Military Academy

Thursday, October 18, 2007 at 2:00 p.m.
Hudson Institute, Inc.
1015th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC, 20005

In July 1997, the Thai baht crashed. In time, the crisis went global. Within the next few years, Russia, Brazil, and Argentina all experienced currency troubles of their own, which many observers believe had their origins in the Asian Financial Crisis. Unlike more traditional conflicts, however, when Asian currencies tumbled there was no “enemy,” no one state or non-state group to blame for the misery. Nations did not face a classic national security problem—and traditional national security solutions would not suffice. Ending the crisis required coordinated international action. The effort of the American interagency team to lead the response to the crisis highlighted the failures of international financial policy and their implications for U.S. national security. Responses to the crisis also offer insights into the roles and missions of the agencies involved and the framework required for developing and executing interagency strategy, policies, and competencies to meet similar challenges in the future.

Alaskan Earthquake Disaster Recovery
By Dwight Ink, President Emeritus, Institute of Public Administration

Thursday, October 4, 2007 at 2:00 p.m.
Hudson Institute, Inc.
1015th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC, 20005

On Good Friday, March 27, 1964, the most severe earthquake ever recorded in North America (9.2 on the Richter scale) struck Alaska, damaging over 50,000 square miles and impacting 60% of the state’s population. The rebuilding complexities presented by earthquake actions, combined with the short Alaskan construction season, led most observers to predict abandonment of much of the Alaskan population by cold weather. However, the unprecedented approaches taken by the President, the unusual leadership role of a senior senator, the strong response of cabinet members, and the unorthodox management strategies developed by career leaders entrusted with directing the rebuilding, combined to produce a successful outcome applauded by the citizenry.

Iran/Contra
By Alex Douville, Director of Policy Studies, Center for the Study of the Presidency

Thursday, July 19, 2007 at 2:00 p.m.
Reserve Officers Association
One Constitution Avenue, N.E.
Washington, D.C., 20002

The Reagan Administration took for granted the power of the President and his Executive Branch as sole executor of U.S. foreign policy. Due to the President’s leadership style and the passage of legislation like the Boland Amendments, which limited funding and restricted covert operations, power not only to develop but to execute policy was shifted from the historic power brokers, the heads of the Departments of State and Defense, to the National Security Advisor (NSA) and the NSC Staff. Consequently, inexperienced entities with fluid command structures and unstructured authority were tasked with developing and carrying out the President’s foreign policies. The ramifications stemming from this led directly to the Iran-Contra affair, which heavily impacted the national security system of the United States.

International Interagency Response to the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami
By Gary Anderson, Science Applications International Corporation

Friday, July 13, 2007 at 10:00 a.m.
Science Applications International Corporation
1710 SAIC Drive
McLean, Virginia, 22102

The 2004 Tsunami in the Indian Ocean spawned a massive global humanitarian response. Various issues arose associated with the transition from relief to reconstruction in four countries which were the primary recipients of U.S. relief efforts (Indonesia, Thailand, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives). The study is divided into a historical summary of the disaster, a general discussion on humanitarian relief operations, challenges associated with international interagency coordination, U.S. interagency issues, and observations on potential lessons learned and recommended improvements.

CORDS and the Vietnam Experience
By Richard W. Stewart, Chief Historian of the U.S. Army Center of Military History

Thursday, June 14, 2007 at 2:00 p.m.
Reserve Officers Association
One Constitution Avenue, N.E.
Washington, D.C., 20002

“CORDS was an experiment in placing all the interagency assets involved in the pacification struggle under one civilian manager but then placing that civilian within the military hierarchy as a Deputy Commander of MACV. This bold move provided the pacification support effort nearly unfettered access to military resources, personnel, and logistics. CORDS was an innovative attempt to build and operate a truly effective interagency headquarters, blending civilian and military agencies and personnel, focused on one mission: smoothing the flow of U.S. pacification support to the government of South Vietnam.”

The National Response Plan and Hurricane Katrina
By John R. Brinkerhoff, Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA)

Thursday, June 7, 2007 at 9:00 a.m.
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C., 20036

The consequences of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and the failure of the levees protecting New Orleans constitute the worst natural disaster ever in the United States. Press accounts and current conventional wisdoms label FEMA as incompetent, unprepared, and unable to deal well with the effects of these two hurricanes. This case study examines one facet of the overall effort, which is the response phase that lasted twelve days from 26 August 2005 to 6 September 2005. It focuses specifically on how well the National Response Plan (NRP) served as a process for coordinating Federal efforts.

Propaganda and Psychological Operations (Cold War)
By Professor Carnes Lord, Professor of Military and Naval History, Naval War College

Thursday, May 17, 2007 at 2:00 p.m.
Reserve Officers Association
One Constitution Avenue, N.E.
Washington, D.C., 20002

Military psychological operations were at best a marginal feature of US psychological-political activity throughout the Cold War. Handicapped from the start by the distrust of the PSYOP function and its practitioners that was (and remains) widespread in the conventional military, US Army and Air Force PSYOP elements have generally played a modest role in support of US troops on the battlefield and managing civilian populations in combat zones. During the Vietnam War, the peculiar requirements of counterinsurgency warfare led to the creation of a unique organization, the Joint US Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO), which brought together military PSYOP and public affairs officers with civilians from USIA and other agencies.

Response to the Influenza Pandemic of 1918–1919
By Dr. John Shortal, Center of Military History

Thursday, April 26, 2007 at 2:00 p.m.
Reserve Officers Association
One Constitution Avenue, N.E.
Washington, D.C., 20002

From 1918-1919, the deadliest influenza pandemic in history struck the United States, killing 675,000 out of a population of 105 million. This case study examines the federal government?s response, specifically its inability to contain, track, and prevent the spread of the disease. The disease struck in three separate waves, yet each time the federal government failed to develop a coherent strategy to handle the disaster. The emergence of avian influenza demonstrates that such an epidemic remains a possibility. If a similar pandemic were to occur in the United States today, 90 million people would be sick, 45 million would receive out patient care, 10 million would be hospitalized, and two million would die. In this event, we hope to deliberate on and apply the lessons learned from the 1918-1919 pandemic to discuss recent legislation on pandemic flu preparedness.

Lecture:
Homeland Security Breakfast Series: National Security Reform
With James R. Locher III, Executive Director of the Project on National Security Reform

Friday, May 11, 2007 at 8:00 a.m.
Reserve Officers Association
One Constitution Avenue N.E.
Washington D.C., 20002

9/11, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Hurricane Katrina have provided compelling evidence of the brokenness of the national (including homeland) security interagency system. These, however, are only the most recent examples of a longstanding problem. The interagency system is incapable of timely, effective integration of the diverse expertise and capabilities of the many departments and agencies that contribute to national security. Policy formulation, planning, and execution have suffered, sometimes catastrophically.

To correct this deficiency, the nonpartisan Project on National Security Reform envisions sweeping changes in the executive and legislative branches. Its centerpiece is a National Security Act of 2008, replacing many provisions of the National Security Act of 1947. Mr. Locher will discuss the urgent need for national security reform, problems in interagency performance, and the Project’s plan and approach.