Planning for Reconstruction and Transformation of Japan after WWII
INTRODUCTION:
U.S.
planning for the occupation of Japan after WWII is an example of
successful integration of the government's military and civilian assets
to create a practical strategy for reform and reconstruction of an
occupied territory. The approach to planning between 1941 and 1945
evolved from ad hoc responses to crisis into a formal and forward
looking interagency organization. Though constant tension existed
between military and civilian officials, the immensity of the
nation-building task convinced all involved of the need for
cooperation. The case is important to the Project on National Security
Reform because the way in which the U.S. Government planned for the
political and economic transformation of Japan illustrates how military
and civilian agencies can create cohesive, effective and flexible
strategy.
STRATEGY:
The
interagency strategic and tactical approach was conceived by an
organization known as the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee
(SWNCC), the authoritative policymaking organ for postwar
reconstruction projects. The interagency deliberative process was
vested with the authority of the president and relevant secretaries,
and relied on information transparency and close working relationships
at all levels. In the rare instances when SWNCC could not reach a
consensus, cases advanced to the President for a final decision,
leading to a unified policy emerging from the agencies and fully
sanctioned by the White House.
INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
Prior to the advent of SWNCC, Secretary of War Henry Stimson had
organized an informal group composed of himself, the Secretary of State
and the Secretary of the Navy. These men—known as the “Committee of
Three”—met weekly to resolve interagency problems. The Committee lacked
executive authority, instead serving an essentially advisory function,
and identifying issues for President Roosevelt's consideration.
During this period, Secretary of State Hull had been given primary
responsibility for all postwar planning, and under Roosevelt's orders,
State began considering the problem of occupation just weeks after
Pearl Harbor. The process reached its full scope and depth over the
next several years. On 28 December 1941, the president established an
Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy. However, a lack of
senior level agreement as to the Committee's mission meant pieces of
the plan were being developed in a variety of government offices. There
was no strategic architecture that might have permitted the creation of
practical and actionable policies endorsed by the entire government.
Without integration, it was inevitable that parochial interests (turf,
budget, careers) would present problems.
In 1944, newly-appointed Secretary of State Edward Stettinius sent
a letter to Secretary Stimson and Secretary of the Navy James
Forrestal, formally proposing that the Committee of Three create a
jointly managed secretariat to plan the occupations and fully integrate
U.S. foreign policy. The SWNCC was officially constituted on December
9th and was structured and run in such a way as to ensure that group
members worked as equals to create policy.
EVALUATION:
Nearly all SWNCC decisions became the official U.S. policy of the
occupation, guiding the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (SCAP)
General Douglas MacArthur and his staff. These handbooks, orders and
objectives were prepared to address the expected situation on the
ground. When U.S. forces arrived in late August 1945, SCAP was armed
with the information necessary to act effectively in and adapt quickly
to the chaotic postwar environment.
SWNCC's most valuable output was a coherent set of objectives that
provided a flexible action script for the occupation. The most
important points – the preservation of the institution of Emperor,
retaining the existing government apparatus, defining the rights of all
citizens, and the reformation of land tenure – were implemented within
a few months of MacArthur's arrival, and formed the economic and social
foundation of a stable post-conflict environment that persists today.
RESULTS:
In
reviewing the interagency process during World War II, one analyst
points out three key features: "senior leader involvement, sustained
interaction, and thorough integration" of policy at or below the level
of Assistant Secretary. Planning for the occupation of Japan using the
SWNCC was successful because it provided a forum for the formation of
interagency relationships, incorporated experts from across the
government, and integrated their outputs into sanctioned national
policy. The quality of the interagency process during this period is
demonstrated by the fact that of the 750 issues considered by the SWNCC
before the National Security Act of 1947, only 6 cases were forwarded
to the President for final resolution.
CONCLUSION:
The U.S. approach to Japan's postwar reconstruction evolved as a
response to perceived ineffectiveness in policy implementation.
Ultimately though, the United States, through SWNCC's interagency
process, helped transform Japan from a pre-modern, semi-feudal nation
into a modern, democratic capitalist state. The work of a relatively
small group of military and civilian bureaucrats, led by political and
military elites who cooperated closely in pursuit of common objectives,
proved essential for achieving this change.
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