INTRODUCTION:
The Iran-Contra affair resulted from two separate operations: the sale of arms to Iran in hopes that American hostages in Lebanon would be released and the supply of covert military aid to the Nicaraguan Contras waging an insurgency against the anti-American Nicaraguan government. While the diversion of profits from the arms deals to the Contras garnered the most attention at the time, the operations themselves represented a larger failure of the national security system.  This study is important to the goals of the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) in that it does not seek to assign blame or focus on the diversion of money, but instead aims to examine how lapses in the national security policy process resulted in two operations of dubious legality and efficacy.

STRATEGY:
The Reagan administration did not use the existing formal national security structures to conduct its covert policies towards Nicaragua and Iran.  Instead, the operations involving Iran and the Contras were executed in an ad hoc manner.  The consultative process and transparency of the National Security Council (NSC) and the executive departments were abandoned in favor of ad hoc decision-making by a small group of individuals.

In part, the strategy was a direct result of the struggle between the executive and congressional branches of government over authority to determine foreign policy.  In 1982, Congress passed the Boland Amendments, which prohibited the Department of Defense (DOD), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), or any other government agency from providing military aid to the Contras.  The White House viewed this as an attempt to limit its constitutional right to determine foreign policy and sought to bypass the legislation.  To this end, Reagan shifted operational control of Contra policies from the CIA and DOD to the NSC staff, since the latter were not subject to formal congressional oversight and technically did not fall under the amendments’ restrictions.

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
The President’s decision to bypass the NSC and the executive departments was due to a confluence of two factors—the executive-legislative struggle already mentioned and the internal conflicts within Reagan’s informal cabinet government.  This led Reagan to grant his National Security Advisor (NSA) considerable powers to determine, implement, and execute foreign policy rather than simply facilitate decision-making.

EVALUATION:
The conflict between the White House and Congress over control of foreign policy was the root cause of the Iran-Contra affair. This struggle resulted in the executive branch circumventing congressional controls to implement what it deemed were essential operations. Unfortunately, the means chosen—the operationalization of the NSC staff—proved ineffective. The NSA strictly controlled information about the administration’s policies regarding Iran and Nicaragua. While this approach allowed for greater secrecy and quicker decision-making, it did not facilitate improved decision-making or an appropriate level of debate about the policies to be implemented. As a result, policy implementation proved as problematic as policy formation. The NSC staff and NSA lacked the resources, capacity, or expertise to conduct Reagan’s foreign policies in Iran and Nicaragua independent of the other elements of the national security structure.

RESULTS:
The bypassing of the interagency decision-making structure led directly to the ill-advised operations in Iran and Nicaragua.  By empowering only a few individuals with operational authority, a vital layer of discussion and open debate within the NSC was eliminated. This process allowed select actors to monopolize decision-making. They made errors in judgment and showed weakness in management.
The resulting policies worked at cross purposes. For example, trading arms for hostages undercut the State Department’s support for arms embargos against state sponsors of terrorism. The excessive role of the NSA and NSC staff also confused other U.S. government agencies as to who exercised authority over U.S. foreign policy. Such confusion allowed individuals to exploit the prestige of the White House to expand their authority far beyond their positions.

CONCLUSION:
The failure to properly debate the Iranian and Nicaraguan operations within the existing national security structure—which normally includes considerable congressional involvement—led to ad hoc and uncoordinated policies. This lack of integration directly contributed to the arms-for-hostages deal with Iran and allowed for continued covert assistance to the Contras despite congressional prohibitions and substantial opposition within the executive branch.  Nevertheless, the Tower Commission, established to probe the Iran-Contra affair, ignored the larger implications of the scandal and did not recommend sufficiently comprehensive changes to the national security system.