INTRODUCTION: 

In the summer of 1994, President Clinton delivered a speech to the UN General Assembly calling for the eventual elimination of anti-personnel landmines (APLs). At the time, he had bi-partisan support in Congress and the backing of the leadership in the Departments of State and Defense. Yet, mismanagement of the interagency process in developing and implementing a diplomatic strategy resulted in the United States being demonized, sidelined and isolated as 122 other nations negotiated and subsequently signed the “Ottawa Treaty” to ban landmines. This case is important for the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) as it reveals how adherence to Cold War processes and structures is often ill-suited to provide the speed and flexibility needed to meet today’s diplomatic challenges.

STRATEGY: 

The U.S. Government lacked an agreed position on APLs throughout the Ottawa Process, making a strategy all but impossible to formulate. This problem largely resulted from the lack of unified policy development within the interagency or even within departments. Perhaps most damaging to the process was the extended debate within the Department of Defense on the military necessity of APLs. The department was divided between pro-ban members of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) on one side and service representatives in the Joint Staff (JS) on the other. This dispute, compounded by a lack of clear signals from the White House, made it difficult for the Department of State to formulate an effective diplomatic strategy.

As the process became muddled, high ranking members of the Clinton administration strove to create a new policy. Eschewing in-place mechanisms, partly because of constant press leaks and partly out of a sense of urgency, they devised a policy in support of a limited ban. The revised decision was promulgated by Presidential Decision Directive 48, designed to establish interagency roles and missions relating to APLs. Despite the tone of the directive, finality of decision and unity of purpose had not been achieved within the U.S. Government. Most telling, the document asked the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), NSC, and Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs each to provide separate implementation options for review by the Principals. The administration eventually decided to pursue the APL limits through the regular arms control venue of the UN Conference on Disarmament (CD). This approach was known to be arcane, slow, and very deliberate, but it was a process with which many officials felt comfortable and which others thought appropriate. Unfortunately, this implementation strategy proved unable to keep abreast of the accelerated pace of modern diplomacy.

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER: 

The Joint Staff was virtually impervious to contrary views put forth by OSD. This was because the JS did not require OSD approval for an issue to rise to the chairman’s level and then cross over to the Secretary of Defense, whereas OSD officials could not move an issue up to the Secretary if they did not have agreement from the Joint Staff. This resulted in an antagonistic relationship. Some members of the OSD employed political guerrilla tactics in support of viewpoints. Compounding the situation, there were two teams undertaking APL policy work within the Pentagon, with little sharing of conclusions and findings. This bifurcation of policy work between mid- and high-level officials existed in many interagency processes. Middle managers at State, OSD, and even the JS attempted to steer their own course since the results of the Principals and Deputies meetings were seldom provided nor were there opportunities for mid-level staff to move ideas up to the higher levels. Defense and State’s inability to integrate policy kept negotiators in a constant state of frustration and often forced them into stony silence.

EVALUATION: 

The U.S. Government was not prepared for the direction the Ottawa Process would take. The lack of speed and flexibility demonstrated by the interagency was the natural culmination of a confused process. In the end, the negotiating team lacked a clear goal, a strategy to achieve that goal, or the authority to pursue that strategy. A lack of leadership contributed to the failure to develop a coherent APL policy. The early abstinence on this issue by senior officials made consensus hard to achieve, new positions difficult to craft, and negotiations all but impossible to pursue. The decision to stick with the hide-bound arms control protocols of the CD also slowed down the U.S. responses to the nimble efforts of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL).

In addition, the dueling positions within the Defense Department made the military’s stance on APLs difficult to read, resulting in White House uncertainly and an inability by the State Department to develop a workable strategy. ACDA’s efforts to dominate decision making within the State Department created tensions and apprehensions among members of the U.S. team. Finally, the U.S. Government agencies never engaged the public on this issue, which severely hampered American diplomatic efforts.

RESULTS: 

Most of those involved in the APL policy effort believe that the U.S. lost significant prestige, credibility, and leadership capital due to these problems. But, perhaps the greatest damage was wrought within the interagency process itself. The tactics of leaking stories to the press, working the Congress behind the scenes, and covert collaborators with the ICBL took their toll. Agencies’ positions hardened, suspicions mounted, and feelings of betrayal increased.

CONCLUSION: 

Interagency conflicts impeded the development of a strategy regarding how to address the substantive and public relations issues fueling the international shift against the U.S. position. The mixed messages of the Department of Defense and the White House made policy formation difficult and implementing an effective diplomatic strategy impossible. As a result, the United States was left outside of an important global process, suffered a loss of soft power, and experienced its own interagency crisis.