From Leaning Forward to Opting Out: America’s Rejection of the Ottawa Treaty
INTRODUCTION:
In the summer of 1994, President Clinton delivered a speech to the
UN General Assembly calling for the eventual elimination of
anti-personnel landmines (APLs). At the time, he had bi-partisan
support in Congress and the backing of the leadership in the
Departments of State and Defense. Yet, mismanagement of the interagency
process in developing and implementing a diplomatic strategy resulted
in the United States being demonized, sidelined and isolated as 122
other nations negotiated and subsequently signed the “Ottawa Treaty” to
ban landmines. This case is important for the Project on National
Security Reform (PNSR) as it reveals how adherence to Cold War
processes and structures is often ill-suited to provide the speed and
flexibility needed to meet today’s diplomatic challenges.
STRATEGY:
The
U.S. Government lacked an agreed position on APLs throughout the Ottawa
Process, making a strategy all but impossible to formulate. This
problem largely resulted from the lack of unified policy development
within the interagency or even within departments. Perhaps most
damaging to the process was the extended debate within the Department
of Defense on the military necessity of APLs. The department was
divided between pro-ban members of the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) on one side and service representatives in the Joint
Staff (JS) on the other. This dispute, compounded by a lack of clear
signals from the White House, made it difficult for the Department of
State to formulate an effective diplomatic strategy.
As the process became muddled, high ranking members of the Clinton
administration strove to create a new policy. Eschewing in-place
mechanisms, partly because of constant press leaks and partly out of a
sense of urgency, they devised a policy in support of a limited ban.
The revised decision was promulgated by Presidential Decision Directive
48, designed to establish interagency roles and missions relating to
APLs. Despite the tone of the directive, finality of decision and unity
of purpose had not been achieved within the U.S. Government. Most
telling, the document asked the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
(ACDA), NSC, and Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military
Affairs each to provide separate implementation options for review by
the Principals. The administration eventually decided to pursue the APL
limits through the regular arms control venue of the UN Conference on
Disarmament (CD). This approach was known to be arcane, slow, and very
deliberate, but it was a process with which many officials felt
comfortable and which others thought appropriate. Unfortunately, this
implementation strategy proved unable to keep abreast of the
accelerated pace of modern diplomacy.
INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
The Joint Staff was virtually impervious to contrary views put
forth by OSD. This was because the JS did not require OSD approval for
an issue to rise to the chairman’s level and then cross over to the
Secretary of Defense, whereas OSD officials could not move an issue up
to the Secretary if they did not have agreement from the Joint Staff.
This resulted in an antagonistic relationship. Some members of the OSD
employed political guerrilla tactics in support of viewpoints.
Compounding the situation, there were two teams undertaking APL policy
work within the Pentagon, with little sharing of conclusions and
findings. This bifurcation of policy work between mid- and high-level
officials existed in many interagency processes. Middle managers at
State, OSD, and even the JS attempted to steer their own course since
the results of the Principals and Deputies meetings were seldom
provided nor were there opportunities for mid-level staff to move ideas
up to the higher levels. Defense and State’s inability to integrate
policy kept negotiators in a constant state of frustration and often
forced them into stony silence.
EVALUATION:
The U.S.
Government was not prepared for the direction the Ottawa Process would
take. The lack of speed and flexibility demonstrated by the interagency
was the natural culmination of a confused process. In the end, the
negotiating team lacked a clear goal, a strategy to achieve that goal,
or the authority to pursue that strategy. A lack of leadership
contributed to the failure to develop a coherent APL policy. The early
abstinence on this issue by senior officials made consensus hard to
achieve, new positions difficult to craft, and negotiations all but
impossible to pursue. The decision to stick with the hide-bound arms
control protocols of the CD also slowed down the U.S. responses to the
nimble efforts of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL).
In addition, the dueling positions within the Defense Department
made the military’s stance on APLs difficult to read, resulting in
White House uncertainly and an inability by the State Department to
develop a workable strategy. ACDA’s efforts to dominate decision making
within the State Department created tensions and apprehensions among
members of the U.S. team. Finally, the U.S. Government agencies never
engaged the public on this issue, which severely hampered American
diplomatic efforts.
RESULTS:
Most
of those involved in the APL policy effort believe that the U.S. lost
significant prestige, credibility, and leadership capital due to these
problems. But, perhaps the greatest damage was wrought within the
interagency process itself. The tactics of leaking stories to the
press, working the Congress behind the scenes, and covert collaborators
with the ICBL took their toll. Agencies’ positions hardened, suspicions
mounted, and feelings of betrayal increased.
CONCLUSION:
Interagency conflicts impeded the development of a strategy regarding
how to address the substantive and public relations issues fueling the
international shift against the U.S. position. The mixed messages of
the Department of Defense and the White House made policy formation
difficult and implementing an effective diplomatic strategy impossible.
As a result, the United States was left outside of an important global
process, suffered a loss of soft power, and experienced its own
interagency crisis.
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